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Over forty-four million Americans owe more than $1.6 tril-
lion in student loan debt. This debt is nearly impossible to 
discharge in bankruptcy. Attempting to do so may require 
costly and contentious litigation with the Department of Ed-
ucation. And because the Department typically fights every 
case, even initial success can be followed by years of appeals. 
As a result, few student loan borrowers attempt to discharge 
their student loan debt in bankruptcy. 
In this Article, we call on the Department of Education to 
develop a set of ten easily ascertainable and verifiable cir-
cumstances in which it will not contest a debtor’s attempt to 
discharge their student loan debt. Nearly every category of 
no-contest discharge we recommend represents a circum-
stance where the debtor would clearly suffer an undue hard-
ship if forced to continue to attempt repayment. In those cir-
cumstances, the Department of Education should conserve 
taxpayer dollars by consenting to discharge. Specifically, we 
urge the Department of Education to allow a no-contest dis-
charge when the debtor’s income is less than 150 percent of 
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the federal poverty level and at least one of the following: 
(1) the debtor’s household income has been at or below the 
federal poverty level for the last four years; 
(2) the debtor receives disability benefits under the Social 
Security Act; 
(3) the debtor receives disability benefits because of military 
service; 
(4) the debtor’s income is derived solely from retirement 
benefits; 
(5) the debtor is a caregiver of an adult or child as defined 
in the Lifetime Respite Care Act; 
(6) the debtor is a family caregiver of an eligible veteran; 
(7) the debtor did not receive a degree from the institution, 
or the institution closed; 
(8) the debtor’s student loan balance is less than $5,000; 
(9) the debtor made at least three hundred monthly pay-
ments (twenty-five years’ worth) towards their student 
loans, regardless of whether those payments were made 
continuously; or 
(10) the debtor is over the age of sixty-seven. 
Our proposal will not solve every problem, but it would go a 
long way toward resolving many of the grosser inequities 
currently associated with student loans and their treatment 
in bankruptcy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Keldric Dante Mosley was homeless and surviving on food 
stamps and disability benefits from the United States Depart-
ment of Veterans Affairs when he asked the bankruptcy court 
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to relieve him of his $45,000 student loan burden.1 He suffered 
from an array of ailments, including depression, anxiety, 
chronic back pain, swelling, and high blood pressure.2 He never 
obtained his degree because he dropped out to care for his ail-
ing mother.3 He attempted to return to school, but was unable 
to obtain financial aid due to his unpaid student loans.4 He 
looked for work but was unable to find a job.5 In the years be-
fore he sought relief from his student loans, his annual earn-
ings from Social Security and Medicare ranged from $1,287 to 
$7,700.6 
In 1999, filing pro se, Mr. Mosley obtained a bankruptcy 
discharge, pursuant to which the bankruptcy court issued an 
injunction against creditors’ future attempts to collect.7 How-
ever, Mr. Mosley’s student loans were not included in the in-
junction, as such debts are only dischargeable if the debtor 
proves in court that repaying the loans would constitute an un-
due hardship.8 In 2004, Mr. Mosley sought to prove just that. 
Following his bankruptcy, his student loan servicer (first USA 
Funds, and then the Educational Credit Management Corpora-
tion (ECMC)) had continued its efforts to collect on the out-
standing student loans, despite his obvious financial difficulty.9 
ECMC, acting on behalf of the U.S. Department of Education 
(ED),10 objected to Mr. Mosley’s student loan discharge on the 
 
 1. CMC v. Mosley (In re Mosley), 494 F.3d 1320, 1323–24 (11th Cir. 2007). 
 2. Id. at 1323 (noting that some of Mr. Mosley’s injuries were related to his 
military service). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. (“Mosley had brief stints at several jobs, including jobs at Bruno’s 
Supermarket, United Parcel Service, City Sanitation, and a moving company.”).  
 6. Id. 
 7. “A bankruptcy discharge renders the debt uncollectible from the 
individual and protects the debtor from future attempts at collection, making it a 
violation of a court order to do so. But not all debts are dischargeable . . . .” Dalié 
Jiménez, Ending Perpetual Debts, 55 HOUS. L. REV. 609, 611–12 (2018). 
 8. “[S]tudent loan debts are only dischargeable in bankruptcy if the debtor 
files a separate lawsuit within the bankruptcy case in which she is able to prove 
that it would be an ‘undue hardship’ to repay her student loans.” Id. at 631 
(quoting 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2012)). 
 9. Mosley, 494 F.3d at 1323. 
 10. ECMC is the contractual assignee of federally guaranteed student loans 
owed by a borrower to the ED when that borrower has filed for bankruptcy relief. 
See Rafael Pardo, The Undue Hardship Thicket: On Access to Justice, Procedural 
Noncompliance, and Pollutive Litigation in Bankruptcy, 66 FLA. L. REV. 2101, 
2143 (2014) [hereinafter Pardo, Undue Hardship] (also noting that ECMC is a 
guaranty agency in four states). In these instances, the ED “has chosen ECMC to 
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grounds that he had provided insufficient corroborating evi-
dence of his medical issues.11 Although Mr. Mosley provided 
doctors’ notes, ECMC successfully argued that they were not 
properly authenticated, and the bankruptcy court reluctantly 
excluded them.12 Nevertheless, the bankruptcy court found 
that Mr. Mosley had met the burden of proving undue hardship 
through his credible testimony.13 ECMC appealed to the dis-
trict court, which affirmed,14 and then to the Eleventh Circuit, 
which also affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision to dis-
charge Mr. Mosley’s student loan debt.15 While Mr. Mosley ulti-
mately obtained relief from his student loan debt, the three-
year legal battle necessitated by ECMC’s aggressive litigation 
deprived him of resources that could have been used to improve 
his health and economic stability.16 
Because student loans, unlike other debt, are not auto-
matically discharged in bankruptcy, Mr. Mosley was required 
to bring a separate lawsuit to discharge his student loans, to 
provide additional documentation of his otherwise uncontested 
poverty and medical issues, and to defend his suit against 
ECMC’s repeated attacks.17 Medical debt, credit card debt, and 
even gambling debt are presumptively dischargeable in bank-
ruptcy. But to discharge student loans requires costly litiga-
tion,18 with cost and fee estimates running as high as 
 
represent the federal interest in bankruptcy litigation involving FFELP loans.” Id. 
at 2144. ECMC does not have a contractually specified role regarding student 
loans originated under the Direct Loan Program, which constitutes the bulk of the 
outstanding balance of student loan debt, and the program under which all new 
student loans have been made since July 1, 2010. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 
FISCAL YEAR 2020 BUDGET SUMMARY 36 (2019), https://www2.ed.gov/about/ 
overview/budget/budget20/summary/20summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/C9FK-
EWCB]. In 2019 the outstanding FFEL program loan portfolio was approximately 
$248 billion, compared with $1,084 billion in Direct Loans. Id. at 30, nn.4–5. 
 11. Mosley, 494 F.3d at 1323–24. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 1328. The cost of effectively litigating a student loan adversary 
proceeding can range from $4,000 to $10,000. See Pardo, Undue Hardship, supra 
note 10, at 2137–39, 2141. From an access to justice perspective, it is highly 
problematic to require a bankrupt debtor—indeed, one that may be suffering an 
undue hardship as a result of their student loans—to bear the costs of litigating 
an adversary proceeding. 
 17. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2018). 
 18. Student loans are nondischargeable unless the debtor can prove that the 
loans impose an undue hardship, and this is not an easy hurdle to clear. The 
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$10,000.19 Those who do seek to discharge their student loan 
debt often face overly aggressive litigation tactics20 by the ED 
and its agents.21 Even when debtors clearly face undue hard-
ship, they risk opposition in court and could face years of ap-
peals before obtaining relief. As a result, few student loan bor-
rowers attempt to discharge their student loan debt, even in 
the face of significant financial hardship.22 
Addressing student loan issues is important. Roughly 
 
undue hardship standard is notoriously subjective and can create harsh results. 
See, e.g., Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, The Real Student Loan Scandal: 
Undue Hardship Discharge Litigation, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 179, 183 (2009) 
[hereinafter Pardo & Lacey, Real Student Loan Scandal] (“[T]he legal doctrine 
suggests that the law targets debtors who do not deserve to be targeted, and, to 
make matters worse, those debtors face inconsistent application of the law.”); 
Kevin J. Smith, Defining the Brunner Test’s Three Parts: Time to Set a National 
Standard for All Three Parts to Determine When to Allow the Discharge of Federal 
Student Loans, 58 S.D. L. REV. 250, 261 (2013). Some courts go so far as to insist 
the debtor show a “certainty of hopelessness” to receive a discharge. See 
discussion infra Section II.B.1. A majority of circuits have also read a good faith 
requirement into the statute, which has resulted in denials of discharge even in 
cases of severe hardship. Id. Additionally, debtors often must offer expert 
testimony to succeed in obtaining a discharge. See Mosley, 494 F.3d at 1324–25 
(rejecting ECMC’s argument that corroborating evidence is required but noting 
that several bankruptcy and appellate cases did require corroborating evidence). 
 19. See supra note 16. 
 20. Under the ED’s own guidelines, its contractors should not oppose undue 
hardship motions when the cost of doing so would exceed one-third the amount of 
the loan, but it is unclear as to whether ED, its servicers, and guaranty agencies 
routinely undertake this analysis. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 682.402(i)(1), 674.49(c)(4) 
(2019); discussion infra Section III.C. 
 21. Throughout this piece, servicers, lenders, or loan holders operating as 
affiliates of the ED will be collectively referred to as “the ED” or “the ED and its 
agents.” 
 22. In one controversial study, only 0.1 percent of debtors challenged the 
nondischargeability of their student loans. Jason Iuliano, An Empirical 
Assessment of Student Loan Discharges and the Undue Hardship Standard, 86 
AM. BANKR. L.J. 495, 505 (2012); but see Pardo, Undue Hardship, supra note 10, 
at 2124–35, 2129 n.176 (pointing out errors in methodology and arguing that the 
Iuliano study undercounted student loan proceedings). Of those who pursue an 
undue hardship discharge, debtors with medical conditions, debtors who are 
unemployed, and debtors who have very low incomes are more likely to receive a 
discharge of their student loans. Iuliano, supra, at 518; see also Rafael I. Pardo, 
Illness and Inability to Repay: The Role of Debtor Health in the Discharge of 
Educational Debt, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 505 (2008) [hereinafter Pardo, Illness 
and Inability]; Pardo & Lacey, Real Student Loan Scandal, supra note 18, at 226; 
but see Rafael I. Pardo, Taking Bankruptcy Rights Seriously, 91 WASH. L. REV. 
1115, 1159, 1185 tbl.A5 (2016) [hereinafter Pardo, Taking Bankruptcy] (observing 
that in the study sampled there was no statistically significant relationship 
between the debtor’s financial circumstances and the likelihood of litigation 
success). 
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forty-five million Americans owe over $1.5 trillion in student 
loan debt.23 Only about 60 percent of these loans are in active 
repayment.24 More than one million students default on almost 
$20 billion worth of federal student loans each year.25 
Student loans are also increasingly important in the bank-
ruptcy system. More debtors have student loans, and those 
loans are larger than ever. In 2005, only 5.4 percent of bank-
ruptcy filers had student loan debt that totaled more than 50 
percent of their annual income.26 By 2014, however, 16 percent 
of filers—triple the rate of 2005 filers—had student loan debt 
totaling more than 50 percent of their annual income.27 Many 
have decried the current treatment of student loan debt in 
bankruptcy as unworkable28 and have argued that a dramatic 
overhaul of the law is necessary.29 Debtors who have little hope 
 
 23. Zack Friedman, Student Loan Debt In 2019: A $1.5 Trillion Crisis, 
FORBES: INVESTING (Feb. 25, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/zackfriedman/ 
2019/02/25/student-loan-debt-statistics-2019/#69ed6dc7133f [https://perma.cc/ 
PK44-W23G]; Consumer Credit – G.19 Consumer Credit Outstanding (Levels), 
BOARD OF GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYS., https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/ 
g19/HIST/cc_hist_memo_levels.html (last updated June 7, 2019) [https://perma.cc/ 
KF8D-9YRF]. 
 24. The other 40 percent of loans are either not in active repayment because 
the student is still in school or recently graduated (in-school, grace, or deferment 
status), or they are in forbearance or default. Authors’ calculations of the first 
quarter of 2019 from Federal Student Loan Portfolio, FED. STUDENT AID, 
https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/about/data-center/student/portfolio (last visited July 
5, 2019) (follow “Portfolio by Loan Status” hyperlink) [https://perma.cc/K4BX-
4N5A] ($1,446.7 billion in outstanding loans of which only $872.4 billion are in 
repayment). 
 25. This figure understates the magnitude of the problem, as student loans 
are only in default after 270–360 days of non-payment, suggesting that many 
more borrowers are seriously behind on their payments, although not yet in 
default. Further, this figure does not include loans in forbearance. Even with 
these depressed figures, the student loan default rate is higher than the default 
rate for auto loans, of which only 8.5 percent are at least thirty days delinquent. 
Ben Miller, Who Are Student Loan Defaulters?, CTR. AM. PROGRESS (Dec. 14, 
2017, 12:01 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/education-postsecond 
ary/reports/2017/12/14/444011/student-loan-defaulters/ [https://perma.cc/T76V-
L73L] (citing Default Rates, FED. STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/ 
about/data-center/student/default (last visited Aug. 22, 2019) [https://perma.cc/ 
6JK3-RBQS]). 
 26. Tara Siegel Bernard, Judges Rebuke Limits on Wiping Out Student Loan 
Debt, N.Y TIMES (July 17, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/18/your-
money/student-loans/judges-rebuke-limits-on-wiping-out-student-loan-debt.html 
[https://perma.cc/LHJ8-WHAN]. 
 27. Daniel Austin, Student Loan Debt in Bankruptcy: An Empirical 
Assessment, 48 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 577, 588 (2015). 
 28. See discussion infra Section II.B. 
 29. While student loan debt is almost never discharged, some have suggested 
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of repaying their student loans should be able to receive a dis-
charge without the difficulty and expense of litigation.30 
In an effort to patch this unworkable system, we have 
identified ten categories of debtors who we argue should be 
deemed to meet the undue hardship standard without litigat-
ing the issue.31 It is essential to promptly provide these debtors 
with the relief they require.32 Not only would a no-contest dis-
charge be more effective in providing relief to struggling debt-
ors, but it would also be cheaper and less burdensome for the 
government to administer. 
Recognizing the difficulties associated with obtaining a 
legislative change or convincing the courts to adopt a uniform 
approach, we propose that the ED streamline the process of 
discharging student loans in bankruptcy.33 Specifically, we 
urge the ED to ease the path to discharge when a debtor’s in-
come is less than 150 percent of the federal poverty level,34 
and: 
(1) the debtor’s household income has been at or below the 
federal poverty level for the last four years; 
(2) the debtor receives disability benefits under the Social 
 
that is because debtors rarely challenge their student loan debt obligations rather 
than because the debt is “essentially nondischargeable.” See Iuliano, supra note 
22; see also Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, Undue Hardship in the 
Bankruptcy Courts: An Empirical Assessment of Educational Debt, 74 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 405, 479 (2005) [hereinafter Pardo & Lacey, Undue Hardship in Bankruptcy 
Courts] (“Our data therefore suggest that, contrary to prevailing opinion, the 
situation for student loan debtors might not be as stark as it has been portrayed—
that is, that an undue hardship discharge is the exception.”). 
 30. Most student loan adversary proceedings do not go to trial, but pretrial 
and trial preparation costs are often incurred to reach a settlement with the ED 
or its agents. See Pardo, Taking Bankruptcy, supra note 22, at 1146 (reporting a 
6.8 percent trial rate). 
 31. Our proposal was inspired by a letter to the ED signed by U.S. 
Representatives Steve Cohen (TN-09), John Conyers (D-MI), Elijah Cummings (D-
MD), and Hank Johnson (D-GA) and by Senators Dick Durbin (D-IL), Jack Reed 
(D-RI), and Elizabeth Warren (D-MA). See Cohen, 6 Members of Congress Urge 
Education Secretary to Bring More Fairness to Struggling Students, 
CONGRESSMAN STEVE COHEN (Mar. 16, 2014) [hereinafter Cohen Letter], 
https://cohen.house.gov/ press-release/cohen-6-members-congress-urge-education-
secretary-bring-more-fairness-struggling [https://perma.cc/CQK3-6F4J]. 
 32. See Pardo, Illness and Inability, supra note 22, at 518–23. 
 33. See infra Part III. 
 34. See infra note 274 (explaining why we chose 150 percent of the federal 
poverty level as our criteria). 
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Security Act; 
(3) the debtor receives disability benefits because of military 
service; 
(4) the debtor’s income is derived solely from retirement 
benefits; 
(5) the debtor is a caregiver of an adult or child as defined in 
the Lifetime Respite Care Act; 
(6) the debtor is a family caregiver of an eligible veteran; 
(7) the debtor did not receive a degree from the institution, or 
the institution closed; 
(8) the debtor’s student loan balance is less than $5,000; 
(9) the debtor made at least three hundred monthly payments 
(twenty-five years’ worth) towards their student loans, 
regardless of whether those payments were made 
continuously; or 
(10) the debtor is over the age of sixty-seven. 
In such cases, we encourage the ED to settle quickly with 
debtors, stipulating to the discharge of their student loans 
without procedural hassle. Settling with debtors—rather than 
raising objections to discharge in these circumstances—would 
be more cost-effective for the taxpayer.35 
 
 35. Our proposal saves money by avoiding objections to discharge when the 
debtor qualifies for a no-contest discharge. We hope our proposal encourages more 
student loan borrowers to discharge their student loan debt and thereby further 
Congress’s intent to discharge student loan debt absent undue hardship. We 
recognize that this could increase the burden on the federal treasury by 
increasing the overall amount of discharged debt—debt which is either directly 
issued or guaranteed by the federal government. But we are skeptical that the 
cost savings from our proposal would be offset by increased numbers of borrowers 
seeking a discharge. We cannot predict the future of course, but previous studies 
have found no evidence that student loan borrowers act strategically. Rajeev 
Darolia & Dubravka Ritter, Strategic Default Among Private Student Loan 
Debtors: Evidence from Bankruptcy Reform, EDUC. FIN. & POL’Y (2019). In any 
event, we believe that taxpayer dollars are well spent if they are used to discharge 
student loans for those whom repayment would be an undue hardship, and poorly 
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This proposal offers several virtues. First, taxpayer money 
would not be wasted defending against adversary proceedings 
that are unlikely to result in meaningful repayment. Second, 
the proposal is consistent with the statutory requirement that 
student loans should only be discharged in cases of undue 
hardship. Third, the use of categories removes excessive subjec-
tivity and uneven application of the legal standard, creating a 
more predictable legal environment.36 And fourth, the clarity of 
standards increases access to justice because borrowers can 
more easily prove that they meet the criteria.37 
Our proposal alone cannot be a complete solution to the 
student loan crisis and is intended to be a floor, not a ceiling, 
for student loan discharge. Furthermore, because our proposal 
is an administrative solution applying to the ED, it cannot ad-
dress loans not issued or guaranteed by the federal govern-
ment—this would require an act of Congress.38 It also does not 
encompass all borrowers suffering an undue hardship; addi-
tional statutory and judicial measures are needed to provide 
relief to every struggling debtor.39 Nevertheless, our proposal 
would provide relief to the most deserving debtors while other 
solutions are debated.40 It may also be useful to judges search-
ing for a framework to resolve these matters.41 
This paper proceeds as follows. First, we discuss the chal-
 
spent in deterring discharge by making specious objections in deserving cases. 
 36. Without a predictable legal environment with a shared understanding of 
the rules that will be applied, litigants are often unwilling to settle their disputes. 
See infra text accompanying note 225. 
 37. While we believe this proposal will improve the administration of justice 
for the worst-off debtors, those who file pro se are likely to continue to struggle 
more than debtors represented by counsel. See Pardo, Taking Bankruptcy, supra 
note 22, at 1160–61. 
 38. This includes private loans. See H.R. 885, 116th Cong. (2019). 
 39. See, e.g., H.R. 2648, 116th Cong. (2019); H.R. 770, 116th Cong. (2019); S. 
1414, 116th Cong. (2019) (removing the provision of the Bankruptcy Code that 
treats student loans differently, so that they would be dischargeable 
automatically); discussion infra Section IV.B. 
 40. House Judiciary, Oversight of Bankruptcy Law and Legislative Proposals, 
U.S. HOUSE COMMITTEE JUDICIARY (Jun. 25, 2019), https://judiciary.house.gov/ 
legislation/hearings/oversight-bankruptcy-law-and-legislative-proposals [https:// 
perma.cc/H6WE-KUCA] (depicting a recorded hearing before the Subcommittee 
on Antitrust, Commercial, and Administrative Law of the House Committee on 
the Judiciary, 116th Congress). 
 41. See Katy Stech Ferek, Judges Wouldn’t Consider Forgiving Crippling 
Student Loans—Until Now, WALL ST. J. (June 14, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www 
.wsj.com/articles/judges-wouldnt-consider-forgiving-crippling-student-loans-until-
now-1528974001 [https://perma.cc/U3D3-KAZK]. 
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lenges facing debtors seeking discharge of their student loans 
in bankruptcy court. We discuss the wide variation in the case 
law interpreting the undue hardship standard, including how 
some courts applying this standard have strayed sharply from 
the statutory language. Second, we explain the details of our 
proposal and how it could be implemented. We also set forth 
some of the virtues of our proposal, including the conservation 
of taxpayer dollars. Third, we contrast our proposal with many 
existing proposals to ameliorate student debtors’ burden, in-
cluding statutory reform, judicial reform, and administrative or 
executive reform. 
Perhaps recognizing the status quo’s untenable nature, the 
ED issued a Request for Information regarding adversary pro-
ceedings seeking discharge of student loans in bankruptcy 
cases.42 Thus, we hope that our proposal will be well received 
on an administrative level. 
I. CURRENT BARRIERS TO STUDENT LOAN DISCHARGES IN 
BANKRUPTCY 
Debtors who file for bankruptcy in hopes of reducing their 
student debt burden face substantial barriers to relief. Under 
the Bankruptcy Code, student loans are presumed nondis-
chargeable.43 A debtor can only overcome that presumption by 
proving that they would suffer an undue hardship if the loans 
were not discharged.44 To prove undue hardship, a debtor must 
initiate a separate lawsuit, known as an adversary proceeding, 
 
 42. Request for Information on Evaluating Undue Hardship Claims in 
Adversary Actions Seeking Student Loan Discharge Bankruptcy Proceedings, 
REGULATIONS (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=ED-2017-
OPE-0085-0001 [https://perma.cc/A45U-XBKQ]. The authors, along with Pamela 
Foohey and eighteen other academics, provided a response to the ED’s RFI. See 
Letter from Dalié Jiménez, Professor of Law, Univ. of Cal. Irvine Sch. of Law, et 
al. to Jean-Didier Gaina, U.S. Dep’t of Educ. 21 (May 22, 2018), https://papers 
.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3183893 [https://perma.cc/PS2W-JT5G]. 
That letter formed the backbone of this Article. 
 43. Initially, only government student loans were presumed 
nondischargeable. That category was expanded to include “any funds received as 
an educational benefit, scholarship, or stipend.” There is considerable confusion 
regarding programs that can be considered an “educational benefit.” See, e.g., 
Jason Iuliano, Student Loan Bankruptcy and the Meaning of Educational Benefit, 
93 AM. BANKR. L. R. 277 (2019). 
 44. 11 U.S.C. § 528 (a)(8) (2018). This section provides that student loans are 
not discharged unless discharging them “would impose an undue hardship on the 
debtor and the debtor’s dependents.” 
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pursuant to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.45 The 
adversary proceeding functions much like a typical lawsuit.46 
Like other lawsuits, it can be costly and complicated, fre-
quently requiring debtors to hire an attorney even if the un-
derlying bankruptcy case could be accomplished pro se.47 These 
expenses, and related obstacles, may discourage many borrow-
ers from attempting to discharge their student debts under the 
current system. 
A. Courts Disagree on the Appropriate Standard to Define 
Undue Hardship 
Debtors who bring an adversary proceeding in the good 
faith belief that they can prove undue hardship may be disap-
pointed due to the law’s inconsistent application. In making 
dischargeability determinations, courts have largely used judi-
cially crafted definitions of undue hardship, with two tests be-
ing the most prominent.48 The bankruptcy courts have gener-
 
 45. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001(6). 
 46. See Matthew A. Bruckner, Improving Bankruptcy Sales by Raising the 
Bar: Imposing a Preliminary Injunction Standard for Objections to § 363 Sales, 62 
CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 14 (2012) (citing SLW Capital, LLC v. Janica Mansaray-
Ruffin (In re Mansaray-Ruffin), 530 F.3d 230, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (“An adversary 
proceeding is essentially a self-contained trial—still within the original 
bankruptcy case—in which a panoply of additional procedures apply.”)). An 
adversary proceeding employs essentially the same rules of procedure as a federal 
civil action, but it is tried in the federal bankruptcy court instead. Christopher M. 
Klein, Bankruptcy Rules Made Easy (2001): A Guide to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure that Apply in Bankruptcy, 75 AM. BANKR. L.J. 35 (2001) (outlining both 
adversary proceedings and contested matters generally). Like a federal civil case, 
the filing of a complaint and the serving of a summons, which defendants must 
answer, initiate adversary proceedings. In re Beard, 112 B.R. 951, 955 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ind. 1990). After the defendant responds, pretrial procedure begins, followed 
by discovery and formal trial. An adversary proceeding concludes with judgment 
or with dismissal. See also Klein, supra. 
 47. See Pardo, Undue Hardship, supra note 10, at 2138 (estimating costs of 
$4,000 to $10,000 to properly litigate a student loan adversary proceeding); Pardo, 
Taking Bankruptcy, supra note 22, at 1148–50 (estimating via a statistical model 
“that, holding all other variables constant, the odds of litigation success decrease 
by 68.9% [45.5, 82.3] if the debtor is self-represented.”). But see Iuliano, supra 
note 22, at 501 (arguing that his empirical evidence demonstrates that attorneys 
are not necessary to increase the chance of success). 
 48. Congress did not define “undue hardship” in the section of the Code 
making student loans presumptively nondischargeable, although they define it 
elsewhere. 11 U.S.C. § 524(m) (a section regarding reaffirmation of debts which 
states that “it shall be presumed that such agreement is an undue hardship on 
the debtor if the debtor’s monthly income less the debtor’s monthly expenses . . . is 
less than the scheduled payments on the reaffirmed debt.”). See Pardo & Lacey, 
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ally coalesced around the Brunner test,49 though some use the 
“totality of the circumstances” test instead.50 
The three-pronged Brunner test requires that debtors 
demonstrate that they (1) “cannot maintain, based on current 
income and expenses, a ‘minimal’ standard of living” for them-
selves and dependents if required to repay their loans; (2) that 
“additional circumstances exist indicating that this state of af-
fairs is likely to persist for a significant portion of the repay-
ment period of the student loans,” and (3) that they have made 
“good faith efforts to repay the loans.”51 By contrast, under 
Long’s totality of the circumstances test, a court evaluates “(1) 
the debtor’s past, present, and reasonably reliable future finan-
cial resources; (2) a calculation of the debtor’s and their de-
pendent’s reasonable necessary living expenses; and (3) any 
other relevant facts and circumstances surrounding each par-
ticular bankruptcy case.”52 
Regardless of the test, court opinions are inconsistent re-
 
Undue Hardship in Bankruptcy Courts, supra note 29, at 510–14; see also Pardo, 
Illness and Inability, supra note 22, at 518; Pardo, Taking Bankruptcy, supra note 
22, at 1177–79; G. Michael Bedinger VI, Time for a Fresh Look at the “Undue 
Hardship” Bankruptcy Standard for Student Debtors, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1817, 1838 
(2014) (citing Michaela White, Student Loan Discharge, NACTT ACAD. FOR 
CONSUMER BANKR. EDUC. (Aug. 21, 2011) at 2, http://considerchapter13.org/2011/ 
08/21/student-loan-discharge-2/ [https://perma.cc/TX3C-YEY8]); Brief for 
Professor Rafael I. Pardo as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant and Urging 
Reversal, Murphy v. United States, No. 14-1691 (1st Cir. July 29, 2015), 2015 WL 
4985562. 
 49. Bankruptcy courts have generally been forced to use the Brunner test 
because the test has been widely adopted by the courts of appeals, thereby making 
it binding precedent that must be followed by bankruptcy courts in the adopting 
circuits. See Pardo, Undue Hardship, supra note 10, 2121. See Brunner v. N.Y. 
Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. (In re Brunner), 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987); see also In 
re Frushour 433 F.3d 393, 400 (4th Cir. 2005) (“An overwhelming majority of 
circuits has now adopted the Second Circuit’s three-part Brunner test”); Steven 
Frederick Werth & Sulmeyer Kupetz, Student Loan Debt Dischargeability – 
Courts Discuss Limits of Brunner Test, Bankruptcy Law News on Bloomberg Law, 
Feb. 2, 2016 (noting that every circuit follows the Brunner test except the First 
and Eighth, which follow Long’s totality of the circumstances test). 
 50. See Long v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Long), 322 F.3d 549, 554 (8th 
Cir. 2003); see also Pardo & Lacey, Undue Hardship in Bankruptcy Courts, supra 
note 29, at 488 n.348 (providing a more complicated origin story for the totality of 
the circumstances test). 
 51. See U.S. Dep’t of Educ. v. Gerhardt (In re Gerhardt), 348 F.3d 89, 91 (5th 
Cir. 2003) (citing Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396). 
 52. Long, 322 F.3d at 554 (citing Andrews v. S.D. Student Loan Assistance 
Corp. (In re Andrews), 661 F.2d 702, 704 (8th Cir. 1981); Andresen v. Neb. 
Student Loan Program, Inc. (In re Andresen), 232 B.R. 127, 132 (8th Cir. B.A.P. 
1999)). 
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garding the circumstances that constitute an undue hardship. 
In Brunner evaluations, courts tend to disagree on what consti-
tutes a “minimal standard of living.” In Long evaluations, there 
is variation in what expenses courts view as “reasonably neces-
sary.”53 Courts also vary substantially in determining what evi-
dence debtors are required to show to establish that their situ-
ation will persist.54  
B. Courts Apply the Same Standard Inconsistently Across 
Cases 
In Undue Hardship in the Bankruptcy Courts: An Empiri-
cal Assessment of the Discharge of Educational Debt, Professors 
Pardo and Lacey analyzed 261 undue hardship opinions issued 
by bankruptcy courts during a ten-year period beginning in 
1993.55 They concluded that “Congress’[s] failure to define un-
due hardship, the requisite condition for discharge of educa-
tional debt, has resulted in a fragmentation of debtor relief—
that is, inconsistent and unprincipled application of the stand-
ard by bankruptcy courts.”56 Courts have, in Pardo and Lacey’s 
telling, continued to offer “differing judicial perceptions of how 
the same standard applies to similarly situated debtors.”57 The 
“eely notion” of undue hardship has resulted in “haphazard” 
decision-making, such that “no significant differences exist be-
tween” debtors whose student loans are discharged and those 
whose discharges are denied.58 
While some disparity in outcome with respect to success-
fully obtaining a student loan discharge can be attributable to 
differences in the severity of the debtor’s distress,59 a review of 
the case law suggests that there is also significant variation 
from court to court with respect to what circumstances qualify 
 
 53. Neither test appears to be more forgiving than the other. See Pardo, 
Taking Bankruptcy, supra note 22, at 1189 tb.A8. 
 54. See infra notes 89–91 and accompanying text. 
 55. Pardo & Lacey, Undue Hardship in Bankruptcy Courts, supra note 29, at 
410. Writing separately, Professor Pardo has also criticized the Brunner test for 
“fractionating”—and thereby dramatically increasing—“the Debtor’s Burden of 
Proof.” Pardo, Undue Hardship, supra note 10, at 2119–20. 
 56. Pardo & Lacey, Undue Hardship in Bankruptcy Courts, supra note 29, at 
411. 
 57. Id. at 406. 
 58. Id. at 405, 478, 480–81. 
 59. See, e.g., Iuliano, supra note 22, at 518. 
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as undue hardship.60 Specifically, there is a lack of consistency 
around questions such as: What standard of living is minimal? 
How can a debtor establish that undue hardship will persist? 
And what is indicative of a lack of good faith? 
1. Proving a “Minimal Standard of Living” 
In assessing what qualifies as a “minimal standard of liv-
ing,” some bankruptcy courts have gone further than what 
Brunner requires and arguably further than what section 
523(a)(8) permits.61 At least two courts have held, “the federal 
poverty guideline is a useful yardstick for determining what is 
a minimal standard of living” and essentially require student 
debtors to live at or near the poverty level.62 At the same time, 
other courts have stated that “[t]he Bankruptcy Code does not 
require that the debtor live in abject poverty before a student 
loan may be discharged.”63 
 
 60. Indeed, there is some debate as to whether the primary cause in variation 
is attributable to difference in debtors or differences in judicial opinion. Compare 
Pardo & Lacey, Real Student Loan Scandal, supra note 18, with Iuliano, supra 
note 22. Courts themselves articulate vastly different views with respect to what 
circumstances qualify as undue hardship, and there are examples of cases with 
similar facts resulting in opposite outcomes. But this does not mean that variation 
in debtor characteristics are irrelevant. 
 61. Under section 707 of the Bankruptcy Code, individuals must pass the 
“means test” to be eligible to file for bankruptcy under chapter 7. 11 U.S.C. § 
707(b) (2018); Census Bureau, IRS Data and Administrative Expense Multipliers, 
U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/ust/means-testing, (last updated Apr. 
12, 2019) [https://perma.cc/KL8B-RFCB]. Individuals earning less than or equal to 
the median income pass the means test without further scrutiny of expenses, 
whereas individuals earning more than the median income only qualify for 
chapter 7 if their disposable income is sufficiently low such that meaningful debt 
repayment is not feasible. This determination is made with very specific 
calculations of allowed expenses, including housing, food, healthcare, childcare, 
clothing, and other required living expenses according to federal or local 
standards as directed. Individuals can also deduct all secured debt expenses for 
mortgages and automobile payments, as well as life insurance and health 
insurance payments. The means test form available on the DOJ website explains 
what expenses may be deducted in determining the debtor’s disposable income. 
OFFICIAL FORM 122A–2, https:// www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/form_b_122a-
2.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZU8K-WXUA]. 
 62. Justice v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Justice), No. 14-13684-JDW, 
2016 Bankr. LEXIS 4100, at 9 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. Nov. 28, 2016); Knox v. Sallie 
Mae (In re Knox), No. 0506951EE, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 3873, at 5. (Bankr. S.D. 
Miss. Nov. 6, 2007). 
 63. O’Donohoe v. Panhandle-Plains Higher Educ. Auth. (In re O’Donohoe), No. 
12-33870, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 2415, at *9 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. June 13, 2013); see 
also Demmons v. R3 Educ., Inc. (In re Demmons), No. 14-11638, 2016 Bankr. 
8. STUDENT DEBT_ (DO NOT DELETE) 2/4/2020  6:52 PM 
198 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91 
Some courts have used the means test tables—the primar-
ily IRS-based expenses allowed in determining whether a 
debtor is eligible for chapter 7 and how much they would have 
to repay in a chapter 13—in assessing what qualifies as a 
minimal standard of living.64 In other cases, judges inject their 
personal preferences as to the debtor’s spending choices.65 As 
noted by the National Consumer Law Center and National As-
sociation of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys,66 this has led to 
situations in which lenders challenging discharge have chided 
debtors for having too many children;67 taking prescription 
drugs;68 taking custody of two grandchildren, one of whom was 
a victim of physical abuse;69 and leaving college without earn-
ing a degree to care for elderly parents.70 
Courts also have different views about how to determine 
 
LEXIS 3659, at 13 (Bankr. E.D. La. Oct. 7, 2016); In re Justice, 2016 Bankr. 
LEXIS 4100, at 10.  
 64. See In re Demmons, 2016 Bankr. LEXIS 3659, at 18. Data from the means 
test tables are used when completing certain forms related to filing for 
bankruptcy. They include data on median family income and certain allowable 
expenses such as food, housing, and transportation. The tables are updated 
regularly, some several times a year. The means test tables are updated monthly; 
an example can be accessed here: Means Testing, U.S. DEP’T JUST., 
https://www.justice.gov/ust/means-testing/20190501 (last updated Apr. 12, 2019) 
[https://perma.cc/2M4G-2XCW]. 
 65. As noted in one study: 
Among the most troubling aspects regarding the 
implementation of undue hardship is the notion that a 
judge, in making the determination of whether to discharge 
educational debt, will invariably impose his or her personal 
views on the proper role of bankruptcy, on the proper role of 
the fresh start, and on the type of debtor who is worthy of 
relief embodied in the Bankruptcy Code. If the meaning of 
undue hardship ultimately rests on the particularized ideals 
held by the judge, legislative enactment becomes permeated 
with an impermissible judicial gloss. 
Pardo & Lacey, Undue Hardship in Bankruptcy Courts, supra note 29, at 520 
(footnote omitted). 
 66. Brief for National Consumer Law Center and National Association of 
Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys in Support of Appellant at 19, Acosta-Conniff v. 
ECMC (In re Acosta-Conniff), 536 B.R. 326 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 2015) (No. 16-
12884). 
 67. In re Walker, 406 B.R. 840, 863 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2009); Ivory v. United 
States, (In re Ivory) 269 B.R. 890, 911 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2001). 
 68. Renville v. Mont. Guaranteed Student Loans (In re Renville), No. 04-
61899-7, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 3211 (Bankr. D. Mont. Jan. 5, 2006). 
 69. Mitcham v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (In re Mitcham), 293 B.R. 138, 141 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ohio 2003). 
 70. Bene v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Bene), 474 B.R. 56, 58 (Bankr. 
W.D.N.Y. 2012). 
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whether a debtor has only a minimal standard of living. In In 
re Justice, a low-income debtor was denied a discharge on the 
basis that he was able to meet a minimal standard of living.71 
There, the debtor’s monthly expenses, including a $389.25 car 
payment for an eight-year-old BMW, exceeded his income by 
$787.25 per month.72 That the debtor drove a BMW seemed to 
bother the court, which denied the debtor a discharge because 
the debtor “has not shown that his expenses have been mini-
mized.”73 But even if the debtor had given up owning a vehicle 
altogether, the debtor in Justice would have been unable to 
cover his monthly expenses. By contrast, in In re Demmons,74 
the court used the means test tables to consider what consti-
tuted a minimal standard of living.75 By doing so, the Dem-
mons court removed its own personal and subjective views 
about the appropriateness of the debtor’s expenses from the 
equation. 
Regardless of whether courts use the Long test or the 
Brunner test, there are many other examples of disagreement 
about whether an expense is necessary for the debtor’s survival 
(thus not exceeding a minimal standard of living).76 Expenses 
 
 71. Justice v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Justice), No. 14-13684-JDW, 
2016 Bankr. LEXIS 4100, at 3 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. Nov. 28, 2016). 
 72. Id. at 2–3. 
 73. Id. at 10–11. 
 74. Demmons v. R3 Educ., Inc. (In re Demmons), No. 14-11638, 2016 Bankr. 
LEXIS 3659, at 18 (Bankr. E.D. La. Oct. 7, 2016). 
 75. See id. 
 76. In In re Hicks, the court rephrased the test as whether the debtor can 
“now, and in the foreseeable future, maintain a reasonable, minimal standard of 
living for the debtor and the debtor’s dependents and still afford to make 
payments on the debtor’s student loans?” Hicks v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re 
Hicks), 331 B.R. 18, 31 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2005). But what is a “reasonable” 
standard of living? In In re Hurst, the appellate panel affirmed a bankruptcy 
court’s finding of no undue hardship in the case of a sixty-six-year-old debtor who 
was set to retire in four years and who had vision, hearing, and ankle ailments. 
Hurst v. S. Ark. Univ. (In re Hurst), 553 B.R. 133 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2016). In In re 
Kemp, a debtor earning between $250 and $600 per week at Lowe’s was denied a 
discharge—the court suggested that she would have sufficient income to 
contribute to her loans if she did not take her daughter on any vacations, avoided 
overdraft fees, used less expensive health care coverage, and used regular gas 
instead of non-ethanol gas. Kemp v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (In re Kemp), 580 B.R. 
879 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2017). By contrast, in In re Fern the bankruptcy court 
granted a discharge to a thirty-five-year-old single mother of three under the Long 
test. Fern v. FedLoan Servicing (In re Fern), 553 B.R. 362, 369–71 (Bankr. N.D. 
Iowa 2016). Although the debtor did not have any medical ailments, she was only 
able to work part time and the court found she made sufficient efforts to maximize 
her earning and minimize her expenses (though the ED suggested that her cell 
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such as vacations, cigarettes, or cable and internet service may 
or may not be considered reasonable depending on the partic-
ular judge assigned to a debtor’s case.77 For example, in In re 
Mosko the court concluded that internet, cell phones, satellite 
TV, and a YMCA membership were not permissible expenses.78 
Similarly, in In re Bott the court found the forty dollar per 
month TV subscription to be impermissible.79 By contrast, 
other courts have allowed debtors to have such things as basic 
internet and phone service and even “frugal” vacations.80 Addi-
tionally, courts are split as to whether charitable expenses81 
and contributions to adult children are reasonable.82 
 
phone and internet expenses were unjustified). Id. 
 77. See Doug Rendleman & Scott Weingart, Collection of Student Loans: A 
Critical Examination, 20 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 215, 281 (2014) 
(comparing cases that allowed or disallowed various expenses in determining 
whether the debtor could maintain a minimal standard of living). 
 78. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Mosko (In re Mosko), 515 F.3d 319, 325 (4th 
Cir. 2008) (“Such items [as internet, cell phones, satellite TV, and a YMCA 
membership] are generally unnecessary to maintain a minimum standard of 
living[.]”). 
 79. Rendleman & Weingart, supra note 77, at 280 (citing Bott v. Educ. Mgmt. 
Corp. (In re Bott), 324 B.R. 771, 777 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2005)) (“Plaintiff should not 
be allowed to have such luxuries [as a forty dollar per month cable TV 
subscription] if she cannot afford to make payments to ECMC.”). 
 80. Id. (citing In re Frushour, 433 F.3d at 400–01) (“In short, the mere fact of 
Frushour’s Internet and cable expenses would not disqualify her from an undue 
hardship discharge.”); Nixon v. Key Educ. Res. (In re Nixon), 453 B.R. 311, 329 
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2011) (allowing expenses of $126 for internet, $67 for cell 
phones, and $68 for landline telephones “because they permit the Plaintiffs to 
have a source of entertainment and allow Elisabeth to apply for employment 
online.”); Innes v. Kan. (In re Innes), 284 B.R. 496, 505 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2002) 
(granting discharge to debtors who spent most of their tax refund on “a single 
frugal summer vacation”). 
 81. Rendleman & Weingart, supra note 77, at 281. Compare Educ. Credit 
Mgmt. Corp. v. Rhodes, 464 B.R. 918, 924 (W.D. Wash. 2012) (“Without 
concluding that all religious or charitable contributions are per se unreasonable 
under § 523(a)(8), this Court grants far less deference to such voluntary 
contributions than to a debtor’s contract-based obligations to his creditors.”), and 
Bush v. United States Dep’t of Educ. (In re Bush), 450 B.R. 235, 244 (Bankr. M.D. 
Ga. 2011) (concluding a $320 monthly charitable contribution is excessive), and 
Simone v. United States (In re Simone), 375 B.R. 481, 504 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2007) 
(no discharge for debtor who made over $7,000 in charitable donations), with 
Cumberworth v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 2005 WL 1387981, at 4 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 
June 7, 2005) (concluding debtor’s charitable spending was not unreasonable 
although it was unnecessary). 
 82. Rendleman & Weingart, supra note 77, at 281. (citing Gill v. Nelnet Loan 
Servs. (In re Gill), 326 B.R. 611, 631–34 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2005)) (reviewing the 
various views courts have taken with respect to whether debtors should be 
permitted to spend funds on adult children as part of a minimal standard of 
living). 
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In sum, there is wide variation among courts in terms of 
what standard of living constitutes a “minimal” standard of 
living. Thus, whether a debtor meets this prong is likely to de-
pend in large part on the happenstance of the location in which 
they file.83 Debtors in two different districts—or even two 
different courtrooms—with the exact same income and ex-
penses may have opposite outcomes with respect to the ques-
tion of whether they are able to meet a minimal standard of 
living. This makes the law seem arbitrary and, therefore, un-
fair. Although our proposal will not remove this discretion and 
variation in all cases, we propose clear categories to capture 
many of the neediest debtors so that weaknesses in the existing 
system do not bar them from access to relief. 
2. Establishing That Undue Hardship Will Persist 
Both the Long and Brunner tests require that the debtor 
prove their hardship will persist for a significant portion of the 
repayment period.84 Unfortunately, courts vary with respect to 
what the debtor must prove to establish that their undue hard-
ship will persist if they are forced to repay their student loans. 
This variation has three major axes. On the first axis, some 
courts have required a “certainty of hopelessness.”85 On the 
 
 83. See Pardo & Lacey, Real Student Loan Scandal, supra note 18 
(considering the signaling function bankruptcy court doctrine serves regarding 
undue hardship); see also Pardo & Lacey, Undue Hardship in Bankruptcy Courts, 
supra note 29, at 499–502 (finding some consistency between certain debtor 
financial characteristics and a bankruptcy court’s determination regarding a 
debtor’s current inability to repay). 
 84. Brunner requires that the debtor demonstrate that “additional 
circumstances exist indicating that this state of affairs is likely to persist for a 
significant portion of the repayment period of the student loans,” and Long 
requires that the debtor provide a reasonably reliable forecast of future financial 
resources. See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text. 
 85. See, e.g., White v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re White), No. 07-41509, 
2008 Bankr. LEXIS 4617, at *14 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. Dec. 17, 2008); Mulherin v. 
Sallie Mae Servicing Corp. (In re Mulherin), 297 B.R. 559, 566 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 
2003) (concluding that a showing of “a certainty of hopelessness” is required 
before an undue hardship discharge can be granted); In re Frushour, 433 F.3d at 
401 (incorporating “certainty of hopelessness” into undue hardship evaluation). 
Many have criticized the notion that a debtor must prove a certainty of 
hopelessness. See, e.g., Richard Fossey, “The Certainty of Hopelessness”: Are 
Courts Too Harsh Toward Bankrupt Student Loan Debtors?, 26 J. L. & EDUC. 29, 
31 (1997); Katheryn E. Hancock, A Certainty of Hopelessness: Debt, Depression, 
and the Discharge of Student Loans, 33 L. & PSY. REV. 151, 165 (2009). We share 
in this criticism. 
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second, others have stated explicitly that a showing of “cer-
tainty of hopelessness” is not required.86 The Fifth Circuit re-
cently held that “student loans are not to be discharged unless 
requiring repayment would impose intolerable difficulties on 
the debtor.”87 On still a third axis, some courts have granted a 
discharge upon a showing that it is just “unlikely” that the 
debtor’s prospects for increasing repayment will improve in the 
future.88 Accordingly, a debtor’s likelihood of receiving a dis-
charge is affected by the random assignment of a particular 
judge to their case. 
Courts are also inconsistent in the amount and type of 
proof they will accept as sufficient to satisfy the debtor’s bur-
den of proving their hardship will persist for a significant por-
tion of the repayment period. Some courts may allow a debtor 
to rely on their own testimony for evidence of medical impair-
 
 86. Krieger v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 713 F.3d 882, 884–85 (7th Cir. 
2013); see also Demmons v. R3 Educ., Inc. (In re Demmons), No. 14-11638, 2016 
Bankr. LEXIS 3659, at 17 (Bankr. E.D. La. Oct. 7, 2016). For example, the In re 
O’ Donohoe court stated that “utter hopelessness” is not required to satisfy the 
first prong. O’Donohoe v. Panhandle-Plains Higher Educ. Auth. (In re O’Donohoe), 
No. 12-33870, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 2415, at 9 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. June 13, 2013) 
(citing Nary v. The Complete Source (In re Nary), 253 B.R. 752, 761 (N.D. Tex. 
2000) (quoting Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hornsby (In re Hornsby), 144 
F.3d 433, 437 (6th Cir. 1998))). Although this statement occurred in the first 
prong and not the second, if “utter hopelessness” is not required to establish that 
the debtor cannot meet a minimal standard of living, a “certainty of hopelessness” 
could not be required to meet the second prong, as long as the debtor’s situation is 
shown to persist for a significant portion of the repayment period. 
 87. Thomas v. Dep’t of Educ. (In re Thomas) 931 F.3d 449, 454 (5th Cir. 2019). 
The debtor was denied discharge of her student loans on the basis that she could 
not prove that her undue hardship would persist, even though she had diabetic 
neuropathy, was over sixty years old, and was unemployed. Her disability forced 
her to leave jobs in the retail and restaurant industries, and a job at UPS. The 
court reasoned that because she had held jobs at a call center and admitted that 
she was capable of “sedentary work,” she did not prove that her situation would 
persist for a significant portion of the repayment period. In upholding Brunner 
and Gerhardt, the court ignored that this exacting standard for discharge was 
developed when student loans were automatically dischargeable after seven 
years. As Professor Bob Lawless pointed out, the court also did not explain “[h]ow 
one set of ambiguous words—‘undue hardship’—can have a plain meaning but 
need to be explained through another set of ambiguous words—‘intolerable 
difficulties[.]’” See Robert M. Lawless, The Fifth Circuit Finds a Way to Make it 
Even Harder to Discharge Loans in Bankruptcy, CREDIT SLIPS BLOG (Aug. 2, 
2019, 5:39 am), https://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2019/08/the-fifth-circuit-
finds-a-way-to-make-it-even-harder-to-discharge-student-loans-in-bankruptcy 
.html [https://perma.cc/7BJJ-MBQ8]. 
 88. Fern v. FedLoan Servicing (In re Fern), 553 B.R. 362, 368 (Bankr. N.D. 
Iowa 2016). 
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ments and inability to obtain adequately compensatory work.89 
However, other courts may require the debtor to produce addi-
tional evidence of continued incapacity—such as expert testi-
mony—even when their own testimony is unrebutted.90 Requir-
ing expert testimony can significantly increase the costs 
associated with seeking the discharge.91 
Finally, many judges and scholars believe that a debtor’s 
ability to repay their student loans without suffering an undue 
hardship should be measured against the repayment period of 
the original loan term.92 However, a few courts have held 
otherwise and measured the debtor’s ability to repay against 
the loan term, as modified by an income-driven repayment 
(IDR) plan.93 Evaluating the debtor’s ability to repay against a 
 
 89. See, e.g., In re White, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 4617, at 5, 14; In re O’ Donohoe, 
2013 Bankr. LEXIS 2415, at 11. 
 90. See In re White, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 4617, at 14. Compare In re 
O’Donohoe, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 2415, at 11 (citing Barrett v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. 
Corp. (In re Barrett), 487 F.3d 353, 359–60 (6th Cir. 2007)) (“[A] debtor is not 
required to present expert testimony to corroborate his own testimony about his 
health.”), with CMC v. Mosley (In re Mosley), 494 F.3d 1320, 1325 (11th Cir. 
2007). 
 91. Daugherty v. First Tenn. Bank (In re Daugherty), 175 B.R. 953, 959. 
(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1994); see also Mosley, 494 F.3d at 1325. For further dis-
cussion on this topic, see Pardo, Illness and Inability, supra note 22, at 517 n.52. 
 92. See, e.g., In re O’Donohoe, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 2415, at 17 (“The Court 
further finds that in this case, an income-contingent plan would serve no useful 
purpose. The Debtor has demonstrated that he has taken his loan obligations 
seriously and has made significant payments toward the Loan.”); Walker v. Sallie 
Mae Serv. Corp. (In re Walker) 650 F.3d 1227, 1234 (8th Cir. 2011); Halverson v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (In re Halverson), 401 B.R. 378, 390 (Bankr. D. Minn. 
2009) (finding the Income Contingent Repayment Plan unaffordable and granting 
discharge); Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Curiston, 351 B.R. 22, 33 (D. Conn. 
2006) (where debtor could not afford minimum IDR payment so participation 
would have been “futile”); Durrani v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Durrani), 
311 B.R. 496, 506 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2004), aff’d, 320 B.R. 357 (N.D. Ill. 
2005) (finding IDR repayments not “realistic” and so granting discharge); John 
Patrick Hunt, Help or Hardship?: Income-Driven Repayment in Student-Loan 
Bankruptcies, 106 GEO. L.J. 1287, 1325–35 (2018). 
 93. See Price v. Devos (In re Price), 573 B.R. 579, 604 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2017) 
(“One might fairly characterize the initial, contractual loan term of a federally 
guaranteed student loan as a ‘conditional’ repayment period, subject to 
modification based on subsequent events.”); see also Jones v. Bank One Texas, 376 
B.R. 130, 135 (W.D. Tex. 2007); Parker v. Gen. Revenue Corp. (In re Parker) 328 
B.R. 548, 553 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2005) (reversing the bankruptcy court’s finding of 
undue hardship, concluding that the availability of IDR resulted in the debtor’s 
ability to make payments on their student loans). Cf. Krieger, 713 F.3d at 886 
(Manion, J., concurring) (“A good and expensive education is no longer a 
guarantee that a good job will ensue. The Wall Street Journal recently featured 
an article headlined, ‘College Grads May Be Stuck in Low-Skill Jobs.’ Ben 
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longer repayment period makes it more difficult for a debtor to 
establish that their hardship will persist for a significant por-
tion of the remaining repayment period. 
3. Showing “Good Faith” 
There is no “per se” requirement that debtors enter into an 
IDR plan to demonstrate their good faith and receive a dis-
charge.94 The Seventh Circuit, for example, has held that it is 
inappropriate to withhold discharge based on the debtor’s un-
willingness to enter into an extended IDR plan.95 Various other 
courts have likewise excused debtors from participating in IDR 
plans when they could not afford the plans.96 By contrast, other 
courts have denied relief to debtors who did not participate in 
such programs. A debtor’s failure to enter an IDR program has 
been described as “probative of her intent to repay her loans” 
though “not a per se indication of a lack of good faith.”97 For ex-
ample, in In re Fields, the Sixth Circuit reversed the bank-
ruptcy appellate panel’s granting of partial discharge on the 
grounds that the debtor “did not use all realistically available 
resources to repay her loans, inasmuch as she had not even ap-
 
Casselman, Wall St. J., Mar. 26, 2013, at A5. While college tuition continues to 
rise, job opportunities appear to be contracting. Hope remains that an eventually 
improving economy will generate more job opportunities. But for those who 
perceive that their employment-seeking efforts are at a dead end, bankruptcy 
should not be the answer. Rather than challenging the nondischargeability 
barrier in bankruptcy, those who have concluded that there is no way they can 
pay off the debt should be required to enroll in the William D. Ford Income-Based 
Repayment Plan.”); Fields v. Sallie Mae Srvcs. Corp. (In re Fields), 286 F. App’x 
246, 250 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 94. See, e.g., Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Polleys, 356 F.3d 1302, 1311 (10th 
Cir. 2004); Coats v. N.J. Higher Educ. Assistance Auth. (In re Coats), 214 B.R. 
397, 405 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1997); Shoberg v. Minn. Higher Educ. Coordinating 
Council, 41 B.R. 684 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984). 
 95. Krieger, 713 F.3d at 884. 
 96. See In re Walker, 650 F.3d at 1234; see, e.g., In re O’Donohoe, 2013 Bankr. 
LEXIS 2415, at 17 (“The Court further finds that in this case, an income-
contingent plan would serve no useful purpose. The Debtor has demonstrated that 
he has taken his loan obligations seriously and has made significant payments 
toward the Loan.”); In re Halverson, 401 B.R. at 390 (finding the Income 
Contingent Repayment Plan unaffordable and granting discharge); Curiston, 351 
B.R. at 33 (where debtor could not afford minimum IDR payment so participation 
would have been “futile”); In re Durrani, 311 B.R. at 506, (finding IDR repayments 
not “realistic” and so granting discharge). 
 97. See Jones v. Bank One Tex., 376 B.R. 130, 142 (W.D. Tex. 2007); see also 
In re Tirch, 409 F.3d 677 (6th Cir. 2005); Polleys, 356 F.3d at 1311. 
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plied for [IDR] relief.”98 
C. Inconsistency and Unpredictability in the Courts Create 
Barriers to Rightful Discharge of Student Loans 
There are a number of issues that arise in undue hardship 
cases that lead to inconsistencies and even lack of adherence to 
the Bankruptcy Code. It is extremely difficult for debtors to as-
certain what precisely they must show and what kind of evi-
dence courts require to grant a discharge. It is also difficult for 
a debtor to know whether to attempt an IDR plan. There are 
serious issues with requiring debtors to hire expert witnesses 
and legal counsel to establish undue hardship, while also re-
quiring that debtors’ potential for repaying these debts be 
hopeless.99 If debtors have the means to pay counsel and expert 
witnesses, they are better off than most debtors, who, as An-
gela Littwin, Katie Porter, and Ronald Mann have noted, often 
lack the means to even pay the filing fee for bankruptcy and 
must save up to file.100 
II. AN ADMINISTRATIVE APPROACH TO UNDUE HARDSHIP 
REFORM 
Numerous proposals for reforming the current treatment 
of student loans in bankruptcy already exist. The most direct 
method of reform would be to revise the Bankruptcy Code it-
self, but legislative changes, while often proposed, have not yet 
been successful.101 We continue to hope for future 
 
 98. In re Fields, 286 F. App’x at 250; see also In re Parker, 328 B.R. at 553 
(reversing a bankruptcy court’s finding of undue hardship, concluding that the 
availability of IDR resulted in the debtor’s ability to make student loan 
payments); In re Tirch, 409 F.3d 677. 
 99. For a discussion, see Pardo, Taking Bankruptcy, supra note 22, 1155 
n.164. 
 100. See, e.g., Angela Littwin, The Affordability Paradox: How Consumer 
Bankruptcy’s Greatest Weakness May Account for Its Surprising Success, 52 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 1933 (2011); Ronald J. Mann & Katherine 
Porter, Saving Up for Bankruptcy, 98 GEO. L.J. 289, 290, 323–24 (2010). 
 101. There were four separate proposals to amend bankruptcy provisions 
regarding student loans in the 115th Congress alone. See Discharge Student 
Loans in Bankruptcy Act of 2017, H.R. 2366, 115th Cong. (2017); Private Student 
Loan Bankruptcy Fairness Act of 2017, H.R. 2527, 115th Cong. (2017); Higher Ed 
Act, H.R. 5549, 115th Cong. (2018); Students Over Special Interests Act, H.R. 
5928, 115th Cong. (2018). See discussion supra Section III.B. 
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congressional action on student loans. In the absence of such 
reform, we have looked to alternative venues in which to 
influence the treatment of student loans in bankruptcy for the 
better. 
A. Clarify the Undue Hardship Standard 
Our proposal seeks primarily to establish clear, noncontro-
versial categories of undue hardship that would inform the 
ED’s use of resources in challenging student loan discharge. 
Our proposal to create certain explicit standards for undue 
hardship offers significant advantages to individual borrowers, 
the ED, and, by extension, all American taxpayers, whether or 
not they borrow student loans or ever file for bankruptcy. As an 
initial matter, borrowers are far more likely to experience uni-
form treatment when a statutory term is explicitly defined.102 
Carefully defined standards enable debtors and lenders to bet-
ter predict how a court would rule, which can facilitate the dis-
charge of student loans without the need for extensive judicial 
intervention.103 Clearly defined standards can also inform bor-
rowers regarding their likelihood of success, and thereby en-
courage the filing of more meritorious cases and fewer frivolous 
ones. Because this will result in conserved resources, the ED 
will be better suited to challenge those cases where discharge 
would not be appropriate under the standards. 
Our proposal seeks to maximize the potential benefits of 
explicit rules regarding undue hardship by identifying circum-
stances that would be easy to verify, thereby obviating the need 
for a trial, an evidentiary hearing, or even formal discovery.104 
Bankruptcy proceedings are characterized by financial disclo-
sure on the part of the filing debtor—most financial infor-
 
 102. See discussion supra Section I.B. 
 103. See Pardo, Undue Hardship, supra note 10, at 2108–09 (arguing for 
greater clarity because of the need for increased predictability and discussing the 
“pollutive litigation” that results without such clarity). 
 104. Adversary proceedings function similarly to a typical lawsuit filed in 
federal court pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See FED. R. 
BANKR. P. 7001–87. In fact, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are extensively 
cross-referenced regarding discovery in adversary proceedings. See, e.g., FED. R. 
BANKR. P. 7027, 7033, 7036. Accordingly, in typical proceedings to discharge 
student loans, a debtor may be required to propound discovery and respond to 
discovery requests. Our proposal would incorporate a more streamlined and less 
cumbersome method of establishing necessary proofs. 
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mation is voluntarily produced even before the debtor files an 
adversary proceeding seeking to discharge their student 
loans.105 Accordingly, factual issues—such as the borrower’s 
current income—are easily discernible, being produced upon 
penalty of perjury as a matter of course.106 Additional factual 
issues could also be proven by referring to certified documents, 
or even to the federal government’s own records, particularly 
regarding disability connected with military service or disabil-
ity pursuant to the Social Security Act. Explicit categories will 
also help borrowers determine whether their circumstances are 
likely to satisfy the undue hardship standard and, accordingly, 
whether it would be worth their time and effort to bring an ad-
versary proceeding seeking discharge. 
Greater clarity and transparency for borrowers will trans-
late into cost savings for the government and consequently for 
taxpayers. Under the current legal landscape, the uncertainty 
regarding what constitutes an undue hardship and the wide-
spread understanding that the burden is exceptionally high 
create the underlying presumption that all adversary proceed-
ings should be defended vigorously.107 Those tasked with re-
sponding to adversary proceedings, typically servicers or their 
 
 105. See 11 U.S.C. § 521(a) (2018). 
 106. See Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 357 (1973) (noting that 
general federal perjury provisions apply to federal bankruptcy proceedings). In 
addition, debtors who file false statements may be subject to criminal prosecution 
for bankruptcy fraud pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 157 (2018). Further, debtors who are 
not forthcoming regarding their property may run the risk of being denied any 
discharge in bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a), 727, 1328(e) (2018). Moreover, 
the United States Trustee is intended to be a “watchdog” over the bankruptcy 
process. U.S. DEP’T JUST., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, THE U.S. 
TRUSTEE PROGRAM’S EFFORTS TO PREVENT BANKRUPTCY FRAUD AND ABUSE, 
REPORT NO. 03-17 (2003) https://oig.justice.gov/reports/OBD/a0317/exec.htm 
[https://perma.cc/XXA7-2DEN]. In fulfillment of the program goals to “protect the 
integrity of the Nation’s bankruptcy system,” the U.S. Trustee performs oversight 
that may include periodic audits of individual cases and reporting material 
misstatements to the court. See 28 U.S.C. § 586(f) (2018); Strategic Plan & 
Mission, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/ust/strategic-plan-mission (last 
updated May 8, 2015) [https://perma.cc/X7ME-QDK5]. Accordingly, debtors are 
highly motivated to be honest in their filings with the bankruptcy court, and 
policing measures are already in place. For a high-profile example of a debtor 
being jailed for bankruptcy fraud, see What You Need to Know About Teresa 
Giudice’s Criminal Case, APP (May 25, 2016, 2:13 PM), https://www.app.com/story/ 
entertainment/2016/05/25/teresa-giudice-criminal-case-timeline/84901790/ 
[https://perma.cc/C4TD-G9KS]. 
 107. See Pardo & Lacey, Real Student Loan Scandal, supra note 18, at 190–91 
(arguing that the perception of uncertain outcomes produces a climate that 
encourages parties to litigate). 
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representatives, are incentivized to oppose a student loan dis-
charge no matter how sympathetic the circumstances.108 This 
was apparent in ECMC’s response to the case of Mr. Mosley, 
described in the introduction.109 Clear, transparent limitations 
on when the ED and its agents should consent to the discharge 
of student loans will decrease unnecessary collection attempts, 
reducing costs to the American taxpayer and opening the bene-
fits of discharge to appropriate categories of borrowers. 
Some may object to concrete, verifiable categories on the 
argument that individual debtors may be incentivized to game 
the system and manipulate their situation to come within one 
of the no-contest categories. As described in depth below, while 
we do not suggest that such an occurrence could not happen, 
we find it highly unlikely that rational individuals would 
choose to do so. Furthermore, all bankruptcy filings are over-
seen by a court tasked with “prevent[ing] an abuse of process” 
and granted the authority to “tak[e] any action or mak[e] any 
determination necessary or appropriate” to do so.110 Instances 
of clear fraud would also result in a denial of discharge for the 
debtor.111 
B. Verifiable Categories of Borrower Circumstances 
Amounting to Undue Hardship 
Our proposal seeks to facilitate the minimum appropriate 
discharge of student loans in circumstances of undue hardship 
by establishing straightforward categories. The ED should not 
oppose student loan discharges in adversary proceedings where 
the borrower’s circumstances fall within one of the designated 
categories. Each of these no-contest categories are easily cal-
culable and verifiable. For example, Mr. Mosley would have 
likely benefited from at least three of the no-contest categories 
we propose (four years of poverty, military service-connected 
 
 108. See id. at 191; Pardo, Undue Hardship, supra note 10, at 2108–09 (noting 
that the high trial rate of adversary proceedings suggest student loan creditors 
may be waging attrition litigation on debtors). 
 109. See Pardo, Taking Bankruptcy, supra note 22, 1152, 1156 (estimating via 
a statistical model “that, holding all other variables constant, the odds of 
litigation success decrease by 70.1% [50.0, 82.1] if ECMC appears as a litigant in 
the adversary proceeding”). 
 110. See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2018). 
 111. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a), 727(a), 1328(e) (2018). 
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disability, or uncredentialed student).112 
Proof of qualification would not require a trial, merely the 
production of corroborating evidence. In some instances, proof 
might already be available in the form of documents previously 
filed in the bankruptcy proceedings. If proof is not already in-
cluded in the record, we recommend that the ED accept a bor-
rower’s written and sworn statements made under penalty of 
perjury. 
The starting point for each category of presumptive dis-
chargeability is the debtor’s income. Individuals require a cer-
tain level of financial assistance to support their lives day-to-
day. Guidelines on poverty generally assume that the amount 
is the same, or nearly the same, for all individuals.113 The fed-
eral poverty level for 2019 is $12,490 for a single-member 
household, $16,910 for a two-person household, and so on, with 
an additional $4,420 for each additional person in the house-
hold.114 
Unfortunately, the federal formula for poverty—like any 
other measure of poverty—suffers from fundamental impreci-
sion, and likely inaccuracies, because of how it is calculated.115 
The federal poverty level was first developed based on the cost 
of healthy food required to support households of varying 
sizes.116 In the 1960s, economist Mollie Orshansky determined, 
based on analysis of data from 1955, that the average house-
hold spent about one-third of its income on food.117 Accordingly, 
poverty was determined to be anything less than three times 
the cost of a healthy diet. Put another way, individuals with in-
come less than this amount should be presumed, based on the 
 
 112. It was shown at trial that Mr. Mosley’s earnings had been below the 
poverty level for the previous ten years, satisfying our first category. See CMC v. 
Mosley (In re Mosley), 494 F.3d 1320, 1325 (11th Cir. 2007). The kind of disability 
rating he received from the VA is unclear, but he was also receiving meager 
disability benefits for service-connected disabilities, potentially qualifying under 
our third no-contest category. Id. He also never graduated from his program, 
which would qualify him as an uncredentialed student in our sixth category. Id. 
 113. Although this assumption is probably fundamentally flawed, particularly 
with regards to health costs, it remains a useful tool for operating federal 
programs across a wide swath of populace. 
 114. See Poverty Guidelines, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Jan. 11, 
2019), https://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty-guidelines [https://perma.cc/2QSN-EQGX]. 
 115. See Angus Deaton, Measuring Poverty, in UNDERSTANDING POVERTY 3 
(Abhijit Vinayak Banergee, Roland Benabou & Dilip Mookherjee eds., 2006). 
 116. See Mollie Orshansky, How Poverty Is Measured, 92 MONTHLY LABOR 
REV. 37, 38 (1969). 
 117. Id. at 38. 
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assumptions in federal law, to be skimping on some of the es-
sentials. 
The assumption that individuals and families operating at 
the poverty level must be going without basic essentials is even 
more likely to be true today than when Orshansky developed 
her model. In the 1950s, food was proportionately a much 
larger part of household expenses.118 Were Orshansky to con-
duct the same analysis on 2012 data, she would find that the 
average share of household income spent on food was 12.8 per-
cent.119 Accordingly, tripling the average cost of food will no 
longer amount to a rough estimate of 100 percent of an indi-
vidual’s or family’s needs but instead to a mere 38.4 percent of 
basic needs. Because the poverty guidelines are still calculated 
on the cost of food, families now must be even more destitute 
than earlier generations to be considered “poor” and are even 
more likely to be going without necessities such as health care, 
housing, or transportation.120 
Recognizing the weaknesses inherent in using the federal 
poverty level, we nevertheless adopt this measurement in an 
effort to facilitate calculation of eligibility for a no-contest dis-
charge and to ensure consistency with other federal programs 
outside of bankruptcy. Pursuant to our proposal, all borrowers 
must have a current monthly income below 150 percent of the 
federal poverty level to fall within a no-contest category.121 
 
 118. See John Cook, How We Measure Poverty: Catching Up with Mollie 
Orshansky, TALK POVERTY (May 23, 2014), https://talkpoverty.org/2014/05/23/ 
cook/ [https://perma.cc/WX3Q-DM48]. 
 119. See id.; Jennifer Brooks & Diana Pearce, Meeting Needs, Measuring 
Outcomes: The Self-Sufficiency Standard as a Tool for Policy-Making, Evaluation, 
and Client Counseling, 34 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 34, 34 (2000) (calculating the 
income necessary to meet basic needs without subsidies). 
 120. At least one study has identified transportation costs as a particular 
challenge for impoverished families, especially in areas where affordable housing 
is located far from employment opportunities. See, e.g., FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., 
FHWA NHTS BRIEF: MOBILITY CHALLENGES FOR HOUSEHOLDS IN POVERTY 2 
(2014), https://nhts.ornl.gov/briefs/PovertyBrief.pdf [https://perma.cc/H5FT-
PEN5]. 
 121. The federal poverty guidelines are the same across most of the United 
States (except Alaska and Hawaii) but vary based on household size. In 2018, a 
one-person household earning less than $12,140 was considered below poverty. 
For a two-person household the 2018 poverty level was $16,460; a three-person 
$20,780; and a four-person $25,100. See Poverty Guidelines, supra note 114. By 
comparison, the median income for a one-person household in Mississippi was 
$39,231 in 2018. Census Bureau Median Family Income by Family Size (Cases 
Filed Between November 1, 2017 and March 31, 2018, Inclusive), U.S. DEP’T JUST., 
https://www.justice.gov/ust/eo/bapcpa/20171101/bci_data/median_income_table.ht
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Lower income borrowers struggle to meet their basic needs; 
frequently, they qualify for programs such as Supplemental 
Nutritional Assistance Program (i.e., food stamps), assistance 
with heating and cooling energy costs,122 and Medicaid (both 
with and without the expansion under the Affordable Care 
Act).123 Families with minor children whose incomes fall below 
150 percent of the federal poverty level qualify for free or re-
duced-price meals at school.124 
Proof of poverty level income will not require debtors to 
produce any additional paperwork because current monthly in-
come must already be calculated for all consumer bankruptcy 
cases.125 Debtors need not be required to produce additional 
evidence of their income.126 
 
m (last visited July 23, 2019) [https://perma.cc/VX4M-3HDA]. 
 122. See Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program, BENEFITS.GOV, 
https://www.benefits.gov/benefit/623 (last visited July 23, 2019) [https://perma.cc/ 
YV2B-NETG] (maximum income for eligibility is 146.7 percent of poverty level). 
 123. See SNAP Eligibility, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/ 
recipient/eligibility (last updated Sept. 4, 2013) [https://perma.cc/Y92K-H9VL] 
(maximum income level is 130 percent of poverty level); Eligibility, CTRS. 
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/eligibility/ 
index.html (last visited July 23, 2019) [https://perma.cc/UAW9-V5VQ]. 
 124. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., FOOD & NUTRITION SERV., THE NATIONAL SCHOOL 
LUNCH PROGRAM (2017), https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/ 
resource-files/NSLPFactSheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/W6MY-NGUM]. 
 125. ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, BANKRUPTCY FORM 122A-1, at line 11 
(2015), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/form_b122a-1.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/XH4Y-F8WN]; ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, BANKRUPTCY FORM 
122C-1, at line 11 (2015), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/form_b122c-
1.pdf [https://perma.cc/76ZG-JB7C]. A possible alternative to using the federal 
poverty level as a qualifier for the no-contest discharge would be to use the 
median household income of a state, which all debtors must list in their 
bankruptcy schedules. See BANKRUPTCY FORM 122A-1, supra, at line 13; 
BANKRUPTCY FORM 122C-1, supra, at line 16. Indeed, others have recommended 
legislative and administrative proposals that use this figure. National Association 
of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys, Comment Letter on Evaluating Undue 
Hardship Claims (May 18, 2018) [hereinafter NACBA Response], 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=ED-2017-OPE-0085-0366 [https:// 
perma.cc/T6DA-GGPM]. Given that median household income varies by state, this 
number is better tailored than the federal poverty guidelines to the differences in 
income across states. However, as a significant number of filers are below the 
median income for their respective states, we felt that a more limited figure would 
be more politically feasible. See Robert M. Lawless, Angela K. Littwin, Katherine 
M. Porter & John A.E. Pottow, Did Bankruptcy Reform Fail: An Empirical Study 
of Consumer Debtors, 82 AM. BANKR. L. J. 349, 363 (2008) (noting that the median 
income of bankrupt households in 2007 was a full 45 percent below the median 
income for the general population). 
 126. The Bankruptcy Code has a somewhat idiosyncratic method for defining 
income. It does not rely on federal income tax returns; rather, the Code defines 
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In addition to satisfying the income requirement, debtors 
would need to fall within one of the following categories to 
qualify for a no-contest discharge: 
1. Four Years of Poverty 
The ED should not object to student loan discharges for 
borrowers whose household income has been at or below the 
federal poverty level for four years prior to filing. Such individ-
uals have demonstrated the kind of sustained income struggles 
that signify an inability to repay student loans. Furthermore, 
the period of time in which a person would need to demonstrate 
income at or below the poverty level would remove concerns re-
garding potential gamesmanship. In theory, it is possible that 
individuals could temporarily depress their income levels in an 
effort to discharge themselves of debt. However, it is both un-
likely and unreasonable to suspect that an individual with in-
come at or below the poverty level for a period of years is delib-
erately earning less in an effort to facilitate the future dis-
charge of student loans.127 The hardships associated with pov-
erty are just too great for any rational individual to voluntarily 
impoverish themselves for that long.128 
Individuals who are sustaining themselves and their fami-
lies at the poverty level for any significant period of time are 
undoubtedly poor enough that any repayment of debt consti-
 
“current monthly income” as an average of all income received during the six-
month period preceding bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(10A) (2018); discussion 
infra notes 140, 152. 
 127. Scholars have documented disturbingly high rates of food and housing 
insecurity, as well as homelessness, for current students. See, e.g., Katharine 
Broton & Sara Goldrick-Rab, The Dark Side of College (Un)Affordability: Food 
and Housing Insecurity in Higher Education, 48 CHANGE: MAG. HIGHER 
LEARNING, Jan./Feb. 2016, at 16–19, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/ 
10.1080/00091383.2016.1121081 [https://perma.cc/KU3G-Y8EQ]; SARA GOLDRICK-
RAB, JED RICHARDSON & ANTHONY HERNANDEZ, WIS. HOPE LAB, ASS’N OF CMTY. 
COLL. TRS., HUNGRY AND HOMELESS IN COLLEGE (2017), http://www.acct.org/ 
files/Publications/2017/Homeless_and_Hungry_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/W3ZA-
7K7Z]. 
 128. See, e.g., ARLOC SHERMAN, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, 
HARDSHIPS ARE WIDESPREAD AMONG FAMILIES IN POVERTY (2004), 
https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/12-20-04pov.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/DFJ4-QHN5] (describing hunger, severe crowding, having utilities cut off, 
going without medical care, and unsafe living conditions among poor families); 
Colleen M. Heflin & John Iceland, Poverty, Material Hardship, and Depression, 90 
SOC. SCI. Q. 1051 (2009) (detailing the association between mental health 
disorders and poverty); DAVID CAPLOVITZ, THE POOR PAY MORE (1967). 
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tutes an undue hardship. As noted above, the poverty level is 
calculated on the basis of the cost of healthy food. Therefore, 
individuals earning less than the federal poverty level are as-
sumed to already be going hungry. Requiring individuals to re-
pay past debt would require them to skimp on even more of 
life’s essentials. Going without food or other staples to repay 
student loans should be considered an undue hardship. Sur-
viving on such little income year after year is a feat in itself; it 
seems self-evident that such individuals will not be capable of 
repaying debt incurred as student loans. 
Proof of long-term poverty could be demonstrated by at-
taching past years’ tax returns to the adversary proceeding 
complaint. Debtors filing under chapter 13 are already required 
to file the previous four years’ worth of tax returns before their 
section 341(a) meeting.129 This requirement serves as the basis 
for our proposed timeline; a longer period would impose addi-
tional requirements on debtors, and a shorter period could po-
tentially allow gamesmanship (even if rational individuals are 
unlikely to cause themselves to be deliberately impoverished 
for any significant period of time). The IRS makes it easy to re-
quest transcripts of past filed returns,130 but because there is 
not a current requirement for debtors in chapter 7 to file tax 
returns, debtors in chapter 7 should be permitted to provide an 
alternative form of proof. 
2. Social Security Disability 
Our proposal would also grant a no-contest discharge of 
student loans to individuals receiving disability benefits under 
the Social Security Act. Although initially conceived only to pay 
retirement benefits to workers over sixty-five, the Social Secu-
rity Act was expanded in 1956 to provide early retirement in-
surance for the “totally and permanently disabled.”131 To ob-
 
 129. See 11 U.S.C. § 1308(a); see also 11 U.S.C. § 521(e)(2)(A)(i) (requiring that 
all debtors provide to the trustee a copy of their return for the “most recent tax 
year ending immediately before the commencement of the case and for which a 
Federal income tax return was filed”). 
 130. Welcome to Get Transcript, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs 
.gov/individuals/get-transcript (last updated July 10, 2019) [https://perma.cc/ 
F7CR-VAL5]. 
 131. See David H. Autor & Mark G. Duggan, The Growth in the Social Security 
Disability Rolls: A Fiscal Crisis Unfolding, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 2006, at 71, 
74 (citing the 1950 grant-in-aid program for state public assistance on which the 
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tain disability benefits under the Social Security Act today, an 
individual must establish “the inability to do any substantial 
gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physi-
cal or mental impairment which can be expected to result in 
death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a con-
tinuous period of not less than 12 months.”132 An individual 
must further demonstrate “a severe impairment” that would 
make it impossible to work in the national economy. An inabil-
ity to work naturally precedes an inability to obtain the income 
necessary to support oneself and any dependents, much less 
repay student loans. 
Recipients of Social Security benefits receive amounts that 
vary based on average lifetime earnings. The maximum 
monthly benefit amount in 2019 is $3,030.50 a month or 
$36,366.00 a year,133 although the average recipient receives 
only $1,197 a month, or $14,364 a year.134 These benefits are 
currently excluded from the calculation of a debtor’s current 
monthly income under the Bankruptcy Code.135 However, even 
if a legislative proposal determined that such amounts should 
be included for purposes of establishing undue hardship, most 
recipients of disability benefits under the Social Security Act 
would satisfy the additional requirement of having a current 
income below 150 percent of the federal poverty standard. 
Proof of eligibility for Social Security disability benefits is 
relatively easy to procure and present in court, as recipients 
need only download a letter from the Social Security website.136 
Accordingly, we recommend that the ED accept such letters as 
proof when attached to an adversary complaint seeking dis-
charge of student loans. Under our proposal, this would be suf-
ficient for the ED to stipulate to a discharge. 
A no-contest discharge for individuals experiencing such 
disability should not be controversial as these individuals are 
already afforded relief outside of the bankruptcy context.137 
 
program was based). 
 132. 20 C.F.R. § 416.905(a) (2019). 
 133. See Social Security Benefit Amounts, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., https:// 
www.ssa.gov/oact/cola/Benefits.html (last visited July 23, 2019) [https://perma.cc/ 
EK5T-6MMH]. 
 134. See id. 
 135. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(10A)–(B) (2018). 
 136. See supra note 133. 
 137. See 28 U.S.C. § 1087(a) (2018); 34 C.F.R. §§ 674.61, 682.402(c), 685.213 
(2019). 
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Recognition of the need for relief outside bankruptcy proceed-
ings should clearly signal that further litigation on the issue is 
unnecessary.138 Any individual who has a permanent disability 
may apply directly to loan servicers for loan forgiveness.139 
This process is not without its problems, as the Consumer Fi-
nancial Protection Bureau has documented.140 If the borrower 
is already in bankruptcy proceedings it is more efficient for the 
ED to simply stipulate to a bankruptcy discharge. There is no 
need for the borrower and the ED to waste time and resources 
on duplicitous applications for relief. Stipulation of discharge in 
these cases would also avoid documented issues caused by ser-
vicer noncompliance.141 
3. Military-Service-Connected Disability 
Our proposal would also grant a no-contest discharge of 
student loans to borrowers who have been determined to be 
unemployable because of a disability incurred in the course of 
military duty. Pursuant to federal law, individuals may receive 
compensation for disability from personal injury that occurred 
 
 138. See 28 U.S.C. § 1087(a) (2018); 34 C.F.R. §§ 674.61, 682.402(c), 685.213 
(2019). 
 139. Total and Permanent Disability Discharge, FED. STUDENT AID, 
https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/repay-loans/forgiveness-cancellation/disability-
discharge (last visited Aug. 22, 2019) [https://perma.cc/5GXD-JWS5]. Of course, 
individuals who only have student loans and no other debt may prefer to simply 
apply for relief directly from the ED rather than file for bankruptcy. 
 140. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CFPB STUDENT 
LOAN OMBUDSMAN 15 (2017), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_ 
annual-report_student-loan-ombudsman_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/W86M-ZD9B] 
(noting that “borrowers complain to the Bureau about issues related to many 
stages of the TPD discharge process, from knowing how or when to apply, to 
providing sufficient proof of their disability.”); Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, CFPB 
Sues Nation’s Largest Student Loan Company, Navient, for Failing Borrowers at 
Every Stage of Repayment (Jan 18, 2017), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/ 
about-us/newsroom/cfpb-sues-nations-largest-student-loan-company-navient-
failing-borrowers-every-stage-repayment/ [https://perma.cc/6UEE-WJD8] (suing 
Navient, the nation’s largest student loan servicer, for reporting loans discharged 
due to disability as delinquent to credit bureaus). 
 141. Written Testimony of Dalié Jiménez, Professor of Law at University of 
California, Irvine School of Law, Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary 
Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial, and Administrative Law, 116th Cong. 
(2019), https://docs.house.gov/meetings/JU/JU05/20190625/109657/HHRG-116-JU 
05-Wstate-JimnezD-20190625.pdf [https://perma.cc/GMJ2-SXXM] (arguing that 
because student loans are presumptively nondischargeable in bankruptcy, 
servicers lack market incentives to improve their processes towards students, 
which increases the likelihood of consumer protection issues). 
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in the line of duty in the active services during a period of 
war.142 Compensation is permitted for physical disabilities or 
mental health conditions, such as post-traumatic stress disor-
der.143 The VA provides a benefit amount graduated according 
to the degree of a veteran’s disability, as measured on a scale 
from 10–100 percent at 10 percent increments.144 Veterans 
with a service-connected disability rated at least 60 percent, or 
with two or more service-connected disabilities with a com-
bined rating of at least 70 percent, and who are found to be un-
able to maintain substantially gainful employment may receive 
compensation up to 100 percent of benefits available based on 
individual unemployability.145 In other words, to receive full 
compensation, an individual must have demonstrated that he 
is unable to “hold down a steady job that supports [him] finan-
cially.”146 Thus, an inability to work equates to an inability to 
provide for oneself and any dependents moving forward, and 
inability to provide basic needs presupposes that repaying stu-
dent loans would constitute an undue hardship. 
Pursuant to a recent act of Congress, the HAVEN Act, vet-
erans’ disability benefits are included in the definition of cur-
rent monthly income under the Bankruptcy Code, much like 
Social Security benefits.147 This change came about in part due 
to extensive lobbying by academics and practitioner groups.148 
As a consequence, an otherwise eligible borrower would not be 
put outside the scope of relief based on income from his veter-
 
 142. 38 U.S.C. § 1110 (2018). 
 143. See VA Disability Compensation for PTSD, U.S. DEP’T VETERANS AFF., 
https://www.va.gov/disability/eligibility/ptsd/ (last visited Aug. 22, 2019) [https:// 
perma.cc/WF67-LW2P]. 
 144. Benefit Rates, U.S. DEP’T VETERANS AFF., https://www.benefits.va.gov/ 
compensation/rates-index.asp (last visited July 23, 2019) [https://perma.cc/QTM2-
P4T2]. 
 145. VA Individual Unemployability (Veterans Who Can’t Work Due to A 
Disability), U.S. DEP’T VETERANS AFF., https://www.va.gov/disability/eligibility/ 
special-claims/unemployability/ (last visited July 23, 2019) [https://perma.cc/7296-
5227]. 
 146. Id. 
 147. See Honoring American Veterans in Extreme Need Act of 2019 (HAVEN 
Act), H.R. 2938, 116th Cong. (2019). 
 148. See Nancy Rapoport & Mary Langsner, Opinion, Why Does the 
Bankruptcy Code Discriminate Against Disabled Veterans?, THE HILL (Jan. 24, 
2019), https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/426854-why-does-the-bankruptcy-code-
discriminate-against-disabled-veterans [https://perma.cc/246V-SYE6]; Jay 
Bender, Elizabeth L. Gunn & John H. Thompson, Defending Our Veterans, ABI J., 
Nov. 2018, at 12 (discussing efforts to exclude veterans’ benefits from the 
definition of current monthly income). 
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ans’ disability benefits. As with Social Security disability bene-
fits, proof of individual unemployability would be easy for the 
borrower to produce and attach to the petition for discharge of 
student loans. A decision notice from the VA could be produced 
by the debtor and status could be confirmed through that 
agency. Accordingly, there is no need for an evidentiary hear-
ing or trial upon a substantiated allegation that a debtor satis-
fies this category. 
The no-contest approach to this category of borrowers is 
consistent with current law outside of bankruptcy. Borrowers 
with service-connected disabilities are already eligible for debt 
relief through direct petition to the applicable lender or the 
Secretary of Education.149 Similar to borrowers receiving social 
security benefits for total and permanent disabilities, borrow-
ers with service-connected disabilities can seek relief directly 
from the ED. Nonetheless, those already seeking debt relief in 
bankruptcy should be able to quickly receive student loan relief 
without having to pursue a separate application process. 
4. Retirement Income 
Unfortunately, elderly Americans are filing for bankruptcy 
at higher rates today than in the past.150 Although student 
loans are typically viewed as the purview of young people, in-
creasingly they are held by older individuals.151 In some cases, 
older borrowers may take out student loans to finance educa-
 
 149. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 682.402(c)(9), 685.213(c) (2019). 
 150. See, e.g., Deborah Thorne et al., The Increasing Vulnerability of Older 
Americans: Evidence from the Bankruptcy Court, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 87 
(2009); Deborah Thorne et al., Graying of U.S. Bankruptcy: Fallout from Life in a 
Risk Society, IND. UNIV., MAURER SCH. OF LAW, LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER 
SERIES, no. 406 (2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3226574 [https://perma.cc/ 
2NFX-STWL]. 
 151. See Stacy Canan & Seth Frotman, A Nationwide Look at How Student 
Debt Impacts Older Adults, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Aug. 18, 2017), 
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/blog/nationwide-look-how-student-
debt-impacts-older-adults/ [https://perma.cc/939Z-EBZC]; CONSUMER FIN. PROT. 
BUREAU, SNAPSHOT OF OLDER CONSUMERS AND STUDENT LOAN DEBT (2017), 
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201701_cfpb_OA-Student-Loan-
Snapshot.pdf [https://perma.cc/RGW4-JTJC]. The average amount of debt held by 
borrowers sixty and older has also dramatically increased. See FED. RESERVE 
BANK OF N.Y., 2016 STUDENT LOAN UPDATE (2016), https://www.newyorkfed.org/ 
medialibrary/interactives/householdcredit/data/xls/sl_update_2016.xlsx [https:// 
perma.cc/VLY3-XMNX] (reporting that average student debt for borrowers sixty 
and older was $12,100 in 2005, and $23,500 in 2015). 
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tion to pursue a second career or to obtain additional train-
ing.152 In other cases, parents may co-sign their children’s stu-
dent loans to assist them through school.153 Students who 
graduate later in life tend to have more student debt on aver-
age, perhaps reflecting a decreased amount of family support or 
a larger amount of family responsibilities.154 In both cases, 
many older borrowers may still have student loans even after 
they reach an age at which continuing to work is both less re-
alistic and less feasible.155 
In theory, older Americans should have money saved for 
retirement, enabling them to provide for themselves without 
working for the rest of their lives. However, for a significant 
percentage of the population, retirement benefits accrued 
through private savings, pension, or by Social Security will be 
inadequate to sustain them at a livable standard.156 These 
 
 152. See Carly Margon, Student Loan Debt: This Generation’s Albatross, 6 
NAT’L CHAMBER REV., Summer 2017, at 1, https://nationalchamberreview.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/07/vol_6_no_3.pdf [https://perma.cc/R45D-HW4S] (noting 
that “by some estimates, nearly as few as one in five modern day college students 
actually qualify as what we would consider ‘traditional’”). Non-traditional 
students are defined broadly to include those who are older than eighteen when 
they begin college, are not dependent on parents, and have their own dependents. 
Id.; see also Adam Looney & Constantine Yannelis, A Crisis in Student Loans? 
How Changes in the Characteristics of Borrowers and in the Institutions They 
Attended Contributed to Rising Loan Defaults, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. 
ACTIVITY, Fall 2015, at 1, 33 (noting that nontraditional borrowers tended to be 
older, with less ability to draw on family and more capacity to borrow). 
 153. SNAPSHOT OF OLDER CONSUMERS AND STUDENT LOAN DEBT, supra note 
151. 
 154. One study has indicated that each year of age at graduation adds an 
average of $312 to cumulative student loan debt. See Steven A. Harrast, 
Undergraduate Borrowing: A Study of Debtor Students and Their Ability to Retire 
Undergraduate Loans, J. STUDENT FIN. AID, no. 1, 2004, at 21, 30; see also Looney 
& Yannelis, supra, note 152, at 2 (“[Nontraditional borrowers] experienced poor 
labor market outcomes, had few family resources, and owed high debt burdens 
relative to their earnings.”). This study also found that nearly 40 percent of 
federal borrowers in 2014 were nontraditional borrowers. Harrast, supra, at 24. 
 155. Evidence indicates that older Americans have a harder time finding 
employment. See Olivera Perkins, Older Workers Suffer from Long-Term 
Unemployment More Than Any Age Group, CLEVELAND.COM (Mar. 23, 2013), 
https://www.cleveland.com/business/2013/03/older_workers_suffer_from_long.html 
[https://perma.cc/G6ML-P3E4]. 
 156. See TERESA GHILARDUCCI, MICHAEL PAPADOPOULOS & ANTHONY WEBB, 
SCHWARTZ CTR. FOR ECON. POLICY ANALYSIS, INADEQUATE RETIREMENT SAVINGS 
FOR WORKERS NEARING RETIREMENT 1–3, (2017), https://www.economic 
policyresearch.org/images/docs/research/retirement_security/Account_Balances_a
djusted_appendix_tables.pdf [https://perma.cc/CR5E-P5AC] (noting that over one-
third of all workers nearing retirement have no retirement savings, and many 
with retirement accounts are likely to outlive their savings). 
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individuals must also look ahead to inevitabilities such as 
declining health, which will require additional spending for 
medical and home care as time moves forward.157 It should be 
accepted as a matter of course that, for these individuals 
subsisting just ahead of the poverty line, repayment of student 
loans would be an undue hardship.158 
Our proposal would allow borrowers whose income is at or 
below 150 percent of the federal poverty level and derived 
solely from retirement funds a no-contest discharge of their 
student loans. In addition to concerns about financial obliga-
tions hounding elderly Americans to their graves, it would be 
an improvident use of taxpayer funds to chase loans from indi-
viduals who are manifestly not in a position to repay them. 
Proof of income (both the amount and the source) is included in 
a debtor’s initial bankruptcy schedules; accordingly, further 
evidentiary hearings or trial are unnecessary to reach a deter-
mination of discharge. 
5. Qualified Caregiver 
Our proposal would allow two categories of caregivers a no-
contest discharge of their student loans in recognition of the 
hardships inherently shouldered by individuals acting in a 
caregiving capacity.159 The first category encompasses borrow-
ers who would be defined as caregivers pursuant to the Life-
 
 157. See TRICIA NEUMAN, JULIETTE CUBANSKI, JENNIFER HUANG & ANTHONY 
DAMICO, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., THE RISING COST OF LIVING LONGER: 
ANALYSIS OF MEDICARE SPENDING BY AGE FOR BENEFICIARIES IN TRADITIONAL 
MEDICARE 2 (2015), http://files.kff.org/attachment/report-the-rising-cost-of-living-
longer-analysis-of-medicare-spending-by-age-for-beneficiaries-in-traditional-
medicare [https://perma.cc/2Q55-N2VQ] (noting that average Medicare per capita 
spending in 2011 more than doubled between age seventy and ninety-six). 
 158. This is especially true because the federal poverty line does not take into 
account that medical costs make up an increasingly large percentage of 
expenditures, particularly for the elderly. See JULIETTE CUBANSKI & TRICIA 
NEUMAN, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES’ OUT-OF-
POCKET HEALTH CARE SPENDING AS A SHARE OF INCOME NOW AND PROJECTIONS 
FOR THE FUTURE i (2018), http://files.kff.org/attachment/Report-Medicare-
Beneficiaries-Out-of-Pocket-Health-Care-Spending-as-a-Share-of-Income-Now-
and-Projections-for-the-Future [https://perma.cc/K4MX-JFP9] (reporting that in 
2013 Medicare beneficiaries’ average out-of-pocket health care spending was 41 
percent of the average per capita Social Security income). 
 159. See, e.g., Robert A. Cummins, The Subjective Well-Being of People Caring 
for a Family Member with a Severe Disability at Home: A Review, 26 J. INTELL. & 
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY 83, 89 (2001) (detailing studies on the hardships 
experienced by family caregivers). 
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time Respite Care Act.160 The second category includes borrow-
ers who are family caregivers of an eligible veteran who quali-
fies for comprehensive assistance under federal veterans’ bene-
fits.161 Family caregivers provide an essential service without 
compensation insofar as they care for individuals who might 
otherwise require public assistance for day-to-day tasks. Indi-
viduals who act as caregivers dedicate time and resources 
which might otherwise be dedicated to gainful employment. 
When such caregivers’ incomes fall below the level necessary to 
realistically repay student debts, they cannot simply “go back 
to work” without compromising their ability to provide neces-
sary care. Accordingly, repayment of student loans in these cir-
cumstances would be an undue hardship for themselves and 
those for whom they care. 
Using these programs’ definitions permits for a simple 
legislative cross-reference, identifying a group that federal law 
has already targeted for assistance in light of the burden they 
shoulder.162 The Lifespan Respite Care Act163 defines family 
caregivers as unpaid adults who provide in-home monitoring, 
management, supervision, or treatment of a child or adult with 
a special need.164 Individuals with special needs are further de-
fined as those who require care or supervision to meet their 
basic needs, prevent physical self-injury or injury to others, or 
avoid placement in an institutional facility.165 Individual 
borrowers who the government has already determined war-
rant increased assistance for respite care, and who satisfy the 
income requirements outlined above, should be presumptively 
considered unable to repay their student loans without incur-
ring undue hardship. 
Pursuant to federal statutes regarding veterans’ benefits, 
 
 160. See 42 U.S.C. § 300ii(5) (2018). 
 161. See 38 U.S.C. § 1720G (2018). 
 162. The authors recognize that many other individuals sacrifice personal 
earning power to care for others and may also be entitled to an undue hardship 
discharge of their student loans. 
 163. The Lifespan Respite Care Act does not provide direct services to 
individuals, but rather funds programs that expand and enhance state respite 
services by streamlining access and improving overall quality. See MAGGIE 
EDGARD & MONICA UHL, ARCH NATIONAL RESPITE CENTER AND RESEARCH 
NETWORK (2011), http://www.nasuad.org/sites/nasuad/files/hcbs/files/212/10555/ 
NationalRespite_Guidelines_Final_October_2011_1MB.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
SCB8-CWCW]. 
 164. 42 U.S.C. § 300ii(5). 
 165. Id. § 300ii(1). 
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the Secretary of the VA is authorized to identify a primary pro-
vider for each eligible veteran and to afford that provider a sti-
pend and thirty days of respite care each year.166 Eligible 
veterans are defined as former members of the armed forces 
who have suffered serious injury in the line of duty and are in 
need of personal care services because of an inability to 
perform the activities of daily living or who need supervision or 
protection.167 The primary provider is a single family member 
of the veteran who provides personal care services, designated 
as such with the veteran’s consent and the approval of the 
Secretary of Veterans Affairs.168 The stipend granted to 
primary providers is calculated based on the number of hours 
of assistance the caregiver provides in a week (up to forty) 
multiplied by the Bureau of Labor Statistics hourly wage for 
home health aides.169 
A stipend received from the Secretary of the VA for provi-
sion of care to an eligible veteran is not included as income 
pursuant to changes made in the HAVEN Act.170 Accordingly, 
if the borrower would fall below the income threshold of 150 
percent of the federal guidelines without the stipend, the bor-
rower should qualify for a no-contest discharge. Individuals 
could easily produce proof of qualification as a primary care-
giver of a veteran simply by providing proof of the stipend in 
addition to proof of general income. 
6. Uncredentialed Student 
Our proposal would also provide a no-contest discharge to 
borrowers who have failed to receive the benefit of the educa-
tion for which the student loans were originally incurred. To 
qualify under this category, borrowers would need to show that 
 
 166. See 38 U.S.C. § 1720G(a)(3)(A) (2018). 
 167. Id. § 1720G(a)(2). 
 168. Id. § 1720G(a)(7). 
 169. See U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, FACT SHEET 11-02: CAREGIVER 
SUPPORT PROGRAM – STIPEND BENEFIT FOR THE PRIMARY FAMILY CAREGIVER 
(2016), https://www.va.gov/COMMUNITYCARE/docs/pubfiles/factsheets/Fact 
Sheet_11-02.pdf [https://perma.cc/WZQ9-EUV9]. The number of hours of personal 
care needed must fall into one of three tiers: the Low Tier equates to a maximum 
of ten hours of care per week, the Medium Tier up to twenty-five hours of care, 
and the High Tier up to forty hours of care. So, for example, if an eligible veteran 
fell into the Medium Tier, and their hourly wage was $12/hour, the primary 
provider could receive $300 per week or $15,600 per year. 
 170. See supra note 147. 
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three or more years have passed since the borrower ceased at-
tending the institution. This delay is intended to limit the cate-
gory to those borrowers who have truly dropped out of school, 
as opposed to those who are taking a hiatus or a temporary 
break. The number of intervening years required to establish a 
true drop out could be revised if necessary, based on empirical 
evidence of the actual characteristics of college dropouts. 
Education is generally understood to be a mechanism 
whereby an individual can improve their opportunities for em-
ployment. Indeed, the government disseminates statistics 
demonstrating the dramatic increase in lifetime earning poten-
tial for those who obtain a postsecondary education.171 
Although evidence suggests that individuals who attend some 
college but fail to obtain a degree do have higher lifetime 
earning potentials compared with individuals whose education 
ends at high school, non-graduates earn substantially less on 
average than those who get a degree.172 To qualify for the no-
contest discharge we propose, such individuals would need to 
demonstrate an income no greater than 150 percent of the pov-
erty line, and research suggests that such low earnings would 
not be anomalous.173 As one study observed, borrowing to pay 
for college “remains a sound investment for most students, but 
many who borrow and then drop out appear to have lost the 
bet.”174 
In fact, a primary justification for making student loans 
nondischargeable in the first place was the prospect of recent 
professional graduates shedding debt just before a lucrative ca-
reer enabled by their financed education.175 As stated by 
 
 171. See, e.g., Education and Lifetime Earnings, SOC. SEC. OFF. RETIREMENT 
POL’Y (Nov. 2015), https://www.ssa.gov/retirementpolicy/research/education-
earnings.html [https://perma.cc/UH5A-ULDV] (citing Christopher R. Tamborini, 
ChangHwan Kim & Arthur Sakamoto, Education and Lifetime Earnings in the 
United States, 52 DEMOGRAPHY 1383 (2015)). 
 172. See id.; see also ANTHONY P. CARNEVALE, STEPHEN J. ROSE & BAN CHEAH, 
GEORGETOWN UNIV. CTR. ON EDUC. & WORKFORCE, THE COLLEGE PAYOFF: 
EDUCATION, OCCUPATIONS, LIFETIME EARNINGS (2011), https://www2.ed.gov/ 
policy/highered/reg/hearulemaking/2011/collegepayoff.pdf [https://perma.cc/KVS3-
97U5]; Comments Regarding the Request for Information on Evaluating Undue 
Hardship Claims in Adversary Actions Seeking Student Loan Discharge in 
Bankruptcy Proceedings, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR. (May 18, 2018) at 18. 
 173. See LAWRENCE GLADIEUX & LAURA PERNA, BORROWERS WHO DROP OUT: 
A NEGLECTED ASPECT OF THE COLLEGE STUDENT LOAN TREND 1 (2005). 
 174. Id. 
 175. See NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMMISSION, BANKRUPTCY: THE 
NEXT TWENTY YEARS 209 (1997). This justification has been strongly criticized 
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Representative John Erlenborn in discussions regarding the 
treatment of student loans in the Bankruptcy Code, students 
who could not obtain credit ordinarily pledge their future 
earning power, which is anticipated to increase because of the 
education.176 Such a justification does not apply to individuals 
who have been unable to complete their degree and whose fi-
nancial circumstances demonstrate that their limited educa-
tion was not a pathway to financial stability. As Susan Dynar-
ski has discussed, recent data indicate that the borrowers who 
default on their loans are typically not borrowers who complete 
a four-year degree, but rather borrowers who drop out of a non-
selective college.177 
Borrowers who drop out of school without obtaining a de-
gree and meet the poverty requirements necessary for this cat-
egory have demonstrated that they have simply not received 
the anticipated benefits of a higher education. Accordingly, it 
would be an undue burden to require them to repay their loans 
in light of their demonstrated lack of earnings. To the extent 
policymakers are concerned that the ability to discharge loans 
will incentivize students to work through months or years of 
higher education, accruing debt as they go only to drop out and 
become impoverished, the likelihood of such an incentive is 
highly implausible. Students generally do not attend college for 
the fun of it,178 and given the difficulties of experiencing pov-
erty,179 it would be irrational for dropouts to deliberately 
accept an impoverished lifestyle to get a loan discharge. Put 
 
over time as being without foundation or empirical bases but has never been 
renounced in the legislature despite the lack of supporting evidence. See also 
Thad Collins, Forging Middle Ground: Revision of Student Loan Debts in 
Bankruptcy as an Impetus to Amend 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8), 75 IOWA L. REV. 733, 
741–42 (1990) (noting that Congressional “ideas about substantial abuse of a 
bankruptcy loophole [regarding student loans] were founded more upon public 
relations hype than real evidence.”); see also Pardo & Lacey, Undue Hardship in 
Bankruptcy Courts, supra note 29, at 419–427. 
 176. See 124 CONG. REC. 1791–93 (1978). 
 177. Susan Dynarski, The Trouble with Student Loans? Low Earning, Not 
High Debt, BROOKINGS (Jan. 7, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-
trouble-with-student-loans-low-earnings-not-high-debt/ [https://perma.cc/5NYS-
FRFS]; Looney & Yannelis, supra note 152. 
 178. At least not when they are financing the education themselves through 
loans. See Ron Dicker, Lori Loughlin’s Daughter in USC Video: ‘I Don’t Really 
Care About School’, HUFFPOST (Mar. 14, 2019), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/ 
lori-loughlin-olivia-jade-dont-care_n_5c88dc34e4b0450ddae5cad2 [https://perma 
.cc/K2NQ-L92X]. 
 179. See supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
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another way, if borrowers would prefer to voluntarily 
experience poverty to avoid repayment, it should be assumed 
that repayment is, in fact, an undue hardship. 
Proof that a borrower failed to receive a degree would be 
relatively easy to obtain through official transcripts. A debtor’s 
submission of official transcripts showing that they never re-
ceived the conferral of a degree should be accepted as conclu-
sive evidence that continued payment would be an undue hard-
ship, and the loans should be discharged without the need for a 
trial or further evidentiary hearing. 
7. Closed School 
Our proposal would grant a no-contest discharge to bor-
rowers who did not complete a program of study at the school 
they took out loans for because the school closed while they 
were enrolled. The justification for this category includes all of 
the reasoning described above with regard to a student who 
has failed to obtain a degree, with the additional consideration 
that when a school closes, the student’s setback is due to fac-
tors outside their control. Even students who go on to complete 
degrees at other institutions are at a disadvantage insofar as a 
transfer frequently requires a loss in academic credits due to 
differing requirements between institutions or a refusal to ac-
cept credits, particularly from an institution that has recently 
closed.180 
Furthermore, a no-contest discharge for such borrowers 
should be largely uncontroversial given that the ED currently 
offers a closed school discharge for individuals who were en-
rolled when the school closed.181 The program does not cur-
 
 180. See Transfer Students Still Lose Lots of Credits, COMMUNITY COLL. DAILY 
(Sept. 14, 2017), http://www.ccdaily.com/2017/09/transfer-students-still-lose-lots-
credits/ [https://perma.cc/VLS9-AXEK] (reporting from statistics gathered by the 
U.S. Government Accountability Office that the percentage of credits lost after 
transfer is 43 percent). 
 181. See 20 U.S.C. § 1087(c)(1) (2018); 34 C.F.R. §§ 682.402(d), 685.214, 
674.33(g) (2019). See also Closed School Discharge, FED. STUDENT AID, https:// 
studentaid.ed.gov/sa/repay-loans/forgiveness-cancellation/closed-school#criteria 
(last visited July 24, 2019) [https://perma.cc/E9CX-X6PG]. Recent news stories 
have shed light on the ED’s unfortunate failure to implement these policies for a 
significant number of closed schools. See Margaret Mattes, Lawsuit Calls on 
Department of Education to Provide Relief to Students Whose Schools Closed, 
STUDENT LOAN BORROWER ASSISTANCE (Dec. 3, 2018), https://www.studentloan 
borrowerassistance.org/lawsuit-calls-on-department-of-education-to-provide-relief-
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rently offer a discharge of student loans to individuals who are 
completing a comparable educational program at another 
school by transferring academic credit.182 However, we would 
extend a no-contest discharge to such students who also satisfy 
the income requirements applicable to all of these categories. 
The difficulty of salvaging any benefit from a student’s time at 
the now-closed institution is likely to artificially inflate the 
amount of student debt an individual is required to take on. 
Borrowers who have demonstrated that their income ap-
proaches the federal poverty guidelines should be considered, 
ipso facto, to suffer an undue hardship if forced to repay stu-
dent loans borrowed for an education that did not result in a 
degree due to the school’s closure. 
Proof of eligibility for this category would be similar to that 
currently required by the ED before it provides a discharge to 
borrowers who attended a closed school. The application cur-
rently requires only an attestation of the applicable facts and 
assignment of the right to pursue a refund to the ED.183 Such 
an attestation should be sufficient to obtain a no-contest dis-
charge in bankruptcy. 
8. De Minimis Borrower 
In addition to the categories described above, which look to 
the borrower’s individual circumstances as justification for a 
no-contest discharge, we propose affording a no-contest dis-
charge to student loans for which the entire amount currently 
 
to-students-whose-school-closed/ [https://perma.cc/A4EV-TKWB]. 
 182. Under the Borrower Defense Rule, students who attended schools that 
have closed are already eligible for discharge of their student loans. This rule is 
both broader and narrower than our proposal with respect to borrowers who 
attended closed schools. On the one hand, it is narrower than our proposal 
because students that transferred credits from the closed school to another school 
are not eligible for relief. On the other hand, it is broader than our proposal 
because our proposal is limited to those students whose income is below 150 
percent of the federal poverty level (and who have filed for bankruptcy). We 
believe that debtors earning less than 150 percent of the federal poverty level 
should be eligible for a no-contest discharge even if they managed to transfer 
some credits, as the transfer did not manage to sufficiently augment their earning 
capacity. See Proposed Rules Amending Direct Loan Program, 83 Fed. Reg. 37,242 
(July 31, 2018) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pts. 668, 674, 682, and 685); Closed 
School Discharge, supra note 181. 
 183. See Loan Discharge Application: School Closure, FED. STUDENT AID, 
https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/sites/default/files/closed-school-loan-discharge-
form.pdf (last visited July 24, 2019) [https://perma.cc/58LE-N6AU]. 
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owed, including principal and interest, is less than $5,000. This 
category has less to do with the perceived undue hardship that 
repayment would impose on the borrower and more to do with 
the expense and hassle that recovering such a sum would in-
flict on the federal government and, by extension, the taxpay-
ers. When a borrower brings an adversary proceeding in bank-
ruptcy to discharge student loans, the borrower is obliged to 
prosecute the case, but the lender is similarly obliged to defend 
it.184 Even entering an appearance to avoid a default judgment 
in the debtor’s favor requires the time and attention of an at-
torney, which necessarily imposes costs on the ED or its 
agents, who must hire counsel and then monitor the attorney’s 
work. Beyond that, in defending against student loan discharge 
claims, the ED or its agents (including, in some cases, the De-
partment of Justice) must pay their counsel to conduct discov-
ery, appear in court, and otherwise participate in the litigation. 
These costs are simply inefficient when loans are below a cer-
tain amount, since even the full recovery of those loans from 
the bankrupt borrower is unlikely to offset the expenses in-
volved in obtaining a favorable judgment.185 
The figure of $5,000, although not based on extensive in-
vestigation as to the reasonable breaking point from a cost 
benefit analysis, provides a clear standard for parties, reducing 
the costs of uncertainty to both borrowers seeking a discharge 
and the ED in deciding whether or not to oppose such a dis-
charge. Using rough, back-of-the-napkin calculations, $5,000 
seems a conservative break point at which defense of a credible 
claim of undue hardship would be inefficient. Assuming an 
hourly rate of $350 for an attorney,186 and recognizing that 
even defending against a simple lawsuit is likely to involve 
hundreds of dollars in other costs,187 it would be a losing 
 
 184. The creditor has the initial burden of proving, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that the debt is education debt; the burden then shifts to the debtor to 
prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the repayment of the debt 
constitutes an undue hardship. See Pardo, Undue Hardship, supra note 10, at 
2113–16, 2141; Pardo, Taking Bankruptcy, supra note 22, at 1165–75. 
 185. Because borrowers falling under our proposal would be living on the cusp 
of poverty, such a recovery is very unlikely to be obtained. See infra Section III.D. 
 186. See RONALD L. BURDGE, UNITED STATES CONSUMER LAW ATTORNEY FEE 
SURVEY REPORT 2015-2016 (2018), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/litigation/ 
tools/atty-fee-survey-2015-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/6KG6-HNQE] (reporting a 
median attorney hourly rate of $350 nationally). 
 187. See Bankruptcy Court Miscellaneous Fee Schedule, U.S. CTS. (Sept. 1, 
2018), http://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/fees/bankruptcy-court-miscellaneou 
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proposition to defend an action to discharge student loans even 
if one could be sure of winning. Furthermore, claims for no-con-
test discharge brought under this provision are likely to be 
meritorious: recall that any borrower seeking to take ad-
vantage of this no-contest discharge would also be required to 
meet the underlying income requirements. In addition, Pardo 
and Lacey have found that when the amount sought to be dis-
charged is less than approximately $5,000, the stakes are in-
sufficiently high for it to be even “potentially worthwhile for 
the creditor to litigate the dispute.”188 This should be neither 
surprising nor controversial. 
Although additional research is needed, preliminary evi-
dence suggests that permitting a discharge of student loan debt 
under $5,000 would provide relief to a significant number of 
debtors, at a relatively low absolute cost to the American tax-
payer.189 According to the Consumer Bankruptcy Project data-
base, 13.2 percent of bankruptcy filers with student loans owed 
less than $5,000 in student loan debt.190 Under current law, 
many of these borrowers are effectively denied the fresh start 
promised by bankruptcy law because of the costs associated 
with obtaining a judgment, and they would suffer an undue 
hardship if forced to repay their student loans.191 Our proposal 
would both increase the efficiency of the system by allowing 
these debts to be discharged and reduce the costs of litigation 
and appeals borne by borrowers and taxpayers.192 
The outstanding loan amount would be easily established 
by simple reference to the debtor’s ED account, thereby making 
discovery or sworn testimony unnecessary. If the loan amount 
falls below the threshold in a case where a debtor has already 
 
s-fee-schedule [https://perma.cc/EWV4-MGNM] for a discussion of miscellaneous 
fees and costs associated with filing or making copies of court proceedings. 
 188. Pardo & Lacey, Real Student Loan Scandal, supra note 18, at 214 n.140. 
 189. See Email from Robert Lawless, Max L. Rowe Professor of Law, Univer-
sity of Illinois College of Law (Oct. 31, 2018) (on file with authors). Consumer 
Bankruptcy Project co-investigators engage in ongoing data collection based on 
national random samples of people who file bankruptcy. More information about 
the project and its methodology are available at Pamela Foohey et al., “No Money 
Down” Bankruptcy, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 1055, 1071–74 (2017). 
 190. Foohey et al., supra note 189, at 1071.  
 191. See discussion supra Part II. 
 192. While we have tried to be extremely narrow, our proposals may grant a 
discharge to someone otherwise thought to be undeserving. That danger lurks in 
everything the law does, but the anecdata it produces is a dangerous tool upon 
which to base policy. 
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established compliance with our proposed income require-
ments, then the ED should stipulate to discharge to more effi-
ciently perform its duties to taxpayers. 
9. Three Hundred Monthly Payments 
We propose a no-contest discharge for borrowers whose in-
come is at or below 150 percent of the poverty level and who 
have made at least three hundred monthly payments (twenty-
five years’ worth) towards their student loans, regardless of 
whether those payments were made continuously.193 We argue 
that repayment after making the equivalent of twenty-five 
years’ worth of payments is an undue hardship on its face.194 
Several federal loan programs currently anticipate forgiveness 
of debt within a similar time frame so long as a borrower has 
been making regular payments.195 We would extend this for-
giveness to debtors in bankruptcy, regardless of whether or not 
they had previously signed up for the federal programs. Such 
forgiveness is not only fair but also efficient. Where the bor-
rower has not obtained loan forgiveness within the twenty-five-
year period, and has an income not more than 150 percent of 
the poverty line, it seems clear that pursuit of loan repayment 
is an unprofitable venture from the perspective of the ED and, 
by extension, the taxpayers who funded the loans at the outset. 
As with the dollar amount, proof of qualification under this 
category should be ascertainable from the ED’s own records, 
therefore obviating the need for formal discovery from the bor-
 
 193. For purposes of our proposal, “payments” include $0 payments when the 
debtor is enrolled in an IDR program and does not owe more. In addition, 
“payments” include fractional payments of the amount invoiced. In other words, 
so long as the debtor pays what is due (e.g., $0 if that is what IDR requires), or at 
least one dollar toward their student loan debt for 300 months, they would receive 
a discharge under our proposal. 
 194. For a discussion of the consequences of long-term debts, see Dalié 
Jiménez, supra note 7, at 634–44. 
 195. For example, Public Service Loan Forgiveness (PSLF) is available to 
qualified borrowers after ten years, or 120 qualifying payments. See 34 C.F.R. § 
685.219 (2019). IDR plans permit loan forgiveness after either twenty or twenty-
five years of qualifying payments, depending on the time period in which the 
loans entered repayment. See 34 C.F.R. § 682.215 (2019). Similarly, Pay As You 
Earn (PAYE) and Revised Pay As You Earn (REPAYE) also forgive student loans 
after twenty or twenty-five years of repayment, depending on the nature of the 
loan. See 34 C.F.R. § 685.209 (2019). In some cases, these plans may allow for a $0 
monthly payment. 
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rower.196 
10. Relief for Seniors 
Finally, we propose a no-contest discharge for borrowers 
whose income is at or below 150 percent of the poverty level 
and who are at least sixty-seven years old.197 As noted in Gray-
ing of U.S. Bankruptcy: Fallout from Life in a Risk Society, 
America’s social safety net for the elderly is badly frayed.198 
And “older Americans who file bankruptcy owe more than 
three dollars for every one dollar in income.”199 Thus, older 
Americans with income at or below 150 percent of the poverty 
level are particularly likely to suffer an undue hardship if 
forced to repay their debt. 200 
C. Conservation of Taxpayer Dollars 
Establishing clear categories of borrower circumstances 
that satisfy the undue hardship standard—thus warranting 
discharge of a borrower’s student loans—is useful in two ways. 
First, it signals to some deserving borrowers that they are 
likely to succeed if they seek to discharge their student loan 
debts. Second, it conserves taxpayer dollars by avoiding the ex-
pense of defending against discharge in cases where discharge-
ability is desirable from a policy standpoint. Sound fiscal prin-
ciples suggest that governments should not expend funds 
where the anticipated recovery or benefit of the expenditure is 
disproportionate to its costs. And it makes little sense for the 
 
 196. Creditors already have a duty to make such disclosures, as they must 
provide a computation of damages that would necessarily include information 
regarding length of time the loan has been in repayment. See FED. R. CIV. P. 
26(a)(1)(A)(iii); Pardo, Undue Hardship, supra note 10, at 2162 n.382. 
 197. We chose this number because it is the age at which one can obtain full 
benefits from social security. Retirement Age Calculators, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., 
https://www.ssa.gov/planners/retire/ageincrease.html (last visited Aug. 22, 2019) 
[https://perma.cc/NGY6-GAET]. 
 198. Deborah Thorne et al., Graying of U.S. Bankruptcy, supra note 150. 
 199. Id. 
 200. In addition, older Americans are likely to fulfill the “persistence” factor 
required by both Brunner and Long, described in Section II.B.2. The average 
sixty-seven-year-old man can expect to live 17.4 more years whereas the average 
woman has a life expectancy of 19.8 years after she is sixty-seven years old. 
Retirement & Survivors Benefits: Life Expectancy Calculator, SOC. SECURITY 
ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/OACT/population/longevity.html (last visited Aug. 
22, 2019) [https://perma.cc/H8ZJ-P5TR]. 
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government to spend money challenging a borrower’s claims 
when the borrower manifestly demonstrates undue hardship. 
As argued above, the list of borrower circumstances is limited 
to situations of extreme hardship, where we believe it is all but 
certain that the government is “throwing good money after 
bad” if it opposes an undue hardship determination in bank-
ruptcy court. 
The ED’s regulations already recognize this principle, 
although we do not think they go far enough. Regulations per-
taining to Federal Family Education Loans (FFEL) require a 
guarantee agency to determine “whether the expected costs of 
opposing the discharge petition would exceed one-third of the 
total amount owed on the loan, including principal, interest, 
late charges, and collection costs.”201 This one-third figure also 
appears in the ED’s regulations covering Federal Perkins 
loans.202 We agree with the ED that the one-third figure is a 
useful heuristic to determine whether pursuing these claims is 
worthwhile. The current regulations, however, are not enough 
to minimize government waste for two reasons. First, both reg-
ulations are phrased in the permissive. As such, they permit 
ED agents to oppose a discharge in bankruptcy even if doing so 
would not be cost-effective.203 Second, and more importantly, 
there is no comparable regulation for Direct Loans, and these 
comprise the vast majority of the ED portfolio.204 
To that end, we urge the ED to amend its regulations to 
better ensure that the cost of pursuing delinquent borrowers 
does not exceed the likely amount to be recovered. Specifically, 
we encourage amendments to 34 C.F.R. § 682.402(i)(1)205 and 
34 C.F.R. § 674.49(c) (the “Regulations”). We recommend al-
tering the language of 34 C.F.R. § 682.402(i)(1) as follows: 
(iii) If the guaranty agency determines that repayment 
would not constitute an undue hardship, the guaranty 
agency must then determine whether the expected costs of 
opposing the discharge petition would exceed one-third of 
 
 201. 34 C.F.R. § 682.402(i)(1). 
 202. 34 C.F.R. § 674.49(c)(4) (2019). 
 203. See id. 
 204. In the first quarter of 2019, the ED reported owning $1.1 trillion in direct 
loans as compared to $277 billion in FFEL loans and $6.9 billion in Perkins loans. 
Federal Student Aid Portfolio, supra note 24. 
 205. 34 C.F.R. § 682.402(i)(1)(iii) (2019). 
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the total amount owed on the loan, including principal, in-
terest, late charges, and collection costs. If the guaranty 
agency has determined that the expected costs of opposing 
the discharge petition will exceed one-third of the total 
amount of the loan, it [shall stipulate to the discharge of the 
borrower’s student loans. If the expected costs of opposing 
the discharge petition will not exceed one-third of the total 
amount of the loan, the guaranty agency shall – ] [may , but 
is not required to, engage in the activities described in 
paragraph (i)(1)(iv) of this section.] 
[(A) Oppose the borrower’s petition for a determination 
of dischargeability; and 
(B) If the borrower is in default on the loan, seek a 
judgment for the amount owed on the loan.] 
 
We further recommend amending 34 C.F.R. § 674.49(c), 
the regulation dealing with Perkins Loans, to mirror this lan-
guage: 
(5) If the expected costs of opposing discharge of such a loan 
[exceed one-third of the total amount owed on the loan, the 
institution shall stipulate to the discharge of the loan. If the 
expected costs of opposing discharge of the loan are less 
than or equal to] one-third of the total amount owed on the 
loan, the institution shall – 
(i) Oppose the borrower’s request for a determination of 
dischargeability; and 
(ii) If the borrower is in default on the loan, seek a 
judgment for the amount owed on the loan. 
(Alterations stricken, underlined, and bracketed.) 
Since these regulations do not apply to the Direct Loans 
program, we urge the ED to develop analogous regulations for 
Direct Loans for clarity, harmonization, and consistency, and 
recommend that these new regulations also include the lan-
guage proposed here. 
We further recommend that the ED implement more force-
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ful enforcement mechanisms to combat waste among its agents. 
For example, Professor Pardo has suggested that the ED 
should “reassess whether ECMC is an appropriate representa-
tive of the federal interest in undue hardship adversary pro-
ceedings.”206 More broadly, there is reason to believe that ED 
agents may sometimes act in their own self-interest, rather 
than in the taxpayers’ best interests.207 Unfortunately, multi-
ple government agencies have found that the ED is failing in 
its servicer oversight.208 Specifically, they found that the ED 
failed to keep track of servicer noncompliance and did not hold 
servicers accountable.209 Like those agencies, we urge the ED 
 
 206. See Pardo, Undue Hardship, supra note 10, at 2137–39, 2144. The 
Inspector General’s 2011 audit of ECMC identified several areas of waste and 
non-compliance. See Letter from Gary D. Whitman, Reg’l Inspector Gen. for Audit 
Servs., U.S. Dep’t of Educ., to Richard Boyle, Chief Exec. Officer, ECMC Grp. Inc. 
21 (Mar. 3, 2011), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/oig/auditreports/fy2011/ 
a05k0001.pdf [https://perma.cc/V86M-HNYY]. For example, the Inspector General 
found that ECMC had effectively loaned $520,183 to one of its subsidiaries, the 
Records & Receivable Management Corporation (RRMC), violating its agreement 
with the ED and exposing the ED to credit risk. Id. at 2–3 (“First, ECMC used 
FSB revenue to support activities that are not allowed per the Agreement. 
Second, ECMC’s CAP did not fully explain the allocation of costs, and ECMC did 
not provide an annual cost allocation report to the Department.”). 
 207. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., REISSUANCE OF FINAL 
AUDIT REPORT, FEDERAL STUDENT AID: ADDITIONAL ACTIONS NEEDED TO 
MITIGATE THE RISK OF SERVICER NONCOMPLIANCE WITH REQUIREMENTS FOR 
SERVICING FEDERALLY HELD STUDENT LOANS ED-OIG/A05Q0008 10 (2019), 
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/oig/auditreports/fy2019/a05q0008.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/743U-WBQW] (“From January 2015 through September 2017, 
monthly reports on FSA’s monitoring activities disclosed recurring instances at all 
servicers of servicer representatives not sufficiently informing borrowers about 
available repayment options.”); SETH FROTMAN, UPDATE FROM THE STUDENT 
LOAN OMBUDSMAN ON REDEFAULTS (May 16, 2017), https://files.consumerfinance 
.gov/f/documents/201705_cfpb_Update-from-Student-Loan-Ombudsman-on-
Redefaults.pdf [https://perma.cc/5B4S-5W4E] (arguing that lawmakers “may wish 
to examine whether an extended period of income-driven rehabilitation payments 
and a complicated collector-to-servicer transition are necessary and whether 
current financial incentives for these companies are in the best interests of 
taxpayers and consumers”). 
 208. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 207; 
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FEDERAL STUDENT LOANS: EDUCATION 
COULD IMPROVE DIRECT LOAN PROGRAM CUSTOMER SERVICE AND OVERSIGHT 
(2016), https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/677159.pdf [https://perma.cc/VC58-TM9Y]. 
 209. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., FEDERAL STUDENT AID: 
ADDITIONAL ACTIONS NEEDED TO MITIGATE THE RISK OF SERVICER 
NONCOMPLIANCE WITH REQUIREMENTS FOR SERVICING FEDERALLY HELD 
STUDENT LOANS 9 (Feb. 12, 2019), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/oig/ 
auditreports/fy2019/a05q0008.pdf [https://perma.cc/4LTP-2G47] (finding, inter 
alia, that Federal Student Aid, a division of the ED, “rarely held servicers 
accountable for noncompliance with requirements”); see also SETH FROTMAN, 
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to implement controls to keep track of servicer issues and pro-
cedures so that it can react accordingly when it finds repeated 
noncompliance. Accordingly, we recommend that when the 
costs of opposing discharge expended by ED agents exceed one-
third of the loans for which discharge is sought, the ED should 
cap reimbursement of collection costs, including legal fees, at 
one-third the total amount of the loan.210 Gross or continued 
violations of this standard should warrant termination of the 
ED’s association with the malfeasant. 
III. THE PROPOSAL IN CONTEXT 
We are not the first to consider reforms to student loan 
bankruptcy provisions. This section provides an overview of 
various proposals for judicial, statutory, and administrative re-
form of the student loan system’s interaction with the Bank-
ruptcy Code, comparing and contrasting others’ approaches 
with our own proposal. 
A. Proponents of Accepting the Current System 
Although calls for reform are loud and frequent, not every 
commentator agrees that there is a fundamental problem with 
section 523(a)(8)’s undue hardship standard. Indeed, a few 
commentators have suggested that the status quo is acceptable, 
or at least is sufficiently workable to provide relief to many 
debtors.211 For example, Professor Jason Iuliano repeatedly ar-
 
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CFPB STUDENT LOAN OMBUDSMAN (2016), 
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/102016_cfpb_Transmittal_DFA_103
5_Student_Loan_Ombudsman_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/W42C-BE4U] (detail-
ing myriad of problems student borrowers encounter). 
 210. Some regulations already provide for limitation on recovery under such 
circumstances. See Pardo, Undue Hardship, supra note 10, at 2114 n.77 
(explaining that regulations “limit the amount of collection costs that a guaranty 
agency can charge a borrower who has defaulted on a student loan under the 
Federal Family Education Loan Program (FFELP),” along with limiting “the 
amount of unpaid interest that can be capitalized on such a loan” and “the sum on 
which interest charges can accrue” (citing 34 C.F.R. § 682.410(b)(2), § 
682.410(b)(3), § 682.410(b)(4) (2013)). As Pardo explains, “[t]hese limitations 
circumscribe a creditor’s right to payment from the student-loan debtor. Thus, the 
creditor’s burden of proof at trial requires it to show that any amount claimed to 
be a debt for a FFELP loan does not exceed the rights to payment that may be 
recovered on account of such a loan.” Pardo, Undue Hardship, supra note 10, at 
2114 n.77. 
 211. See, e.g., Letter from Winfield P. Crigler, Executive Director, Student 
8. STUDENT DEBT_ (DO NOT DELETE) 2/4/2020  6:52 PM 
234 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91 
gues that the current standard is a workable one.212 Although 
he recognizes that “the undue hardship standard is neither 
perfect nor even a particularly reasonable provision,”213 Iuliano 
argues that section 523(a)(8)’s undue hardship standard is nei-
ther unduly burdensome nor inconsistently applied.214 Further-
more, he argues that it would be “unwise to eliminate a provi-
sion that saves billions of dollars” by sorting those who cannot 
repay their loans from those who can.215 
Instead, Iuliano argues that more student loan borrowers 
should seek to discharge their student loans in bankruptcy, 
and that the primary reason they do not is the “chilling effect” 
of ill-informed bankruptcy scholars and judges who claim that 
the undue hardship standard is nearly impossible to satisfy.216 
Some student loan borrowers may avoid bankruptcy altogether 
for precisely that reason.217 Iuliano’s research also suggests 
 
Loan Servicing Alliance, to Mr. Jean-Didier Gaina, U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (May 22, 
2018), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=ED-2017-OPE-0085-0410 [https:/ 
/perma.cc/K59Z-GRQL] (“[T]here is no pressing need to relax the undue hardship 
standard. Many more borrowers today can be helped by an administrative remedy 
such as an [income-driven] repayment plan, or some form of loan forgiveness or 
discharge. And those borrowers that still need additional relief should be 
encouraged to file an adversary proceeding.”); Kyle L. Grant, Student Loans in 
Bankruptcy and the “Undue Hardship” Exception: Who Should Foot the Bill?, 
2011 B.Y.U. L. REV. 819, 820, 845 (2011) (arguing that the Brunner standard is 
“strict but predictable” and that the status quo is appropriate because it is “not 
absurd” and saves taxpayer dollars); Patricia Somers & James M. Hollis, Student 
Loan Discharge Through Bankruptcy, 4 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 457, 484 (1996) 
(urging “common acceptance of the . . . Brunner test for undue hardship,” but also 
“discretion and compassion” for certain borrowers). 
 212. Iuliano, supra note 22, at 495; see also Jason Iuliano, Student Loans and 
Surmountable Access-to-Justice Barriers, 68 FLA. L. REV. 377, 379 (2016) (“[T]he 
widespread pessimism regarding the current undue hardship standard should be 
tempered.”); Iuliano, supra note 43, at 37 (arguing that he has provided a 
“roadmap to push back against” expansive readings of section 523(a)(8), and that 
better strategy alone is sufficient to change the undue hardship landscape). 
 213. Iuliano, Student Loans and Surmountable Access-to-Justice Barriers, 
supra note 212, at 379. 
 214. Iuliano, supra note 22. Not everyone agrees. See discussion infra note 49. 
 215. Iuliano, supra note 22, at 525. 
 216. Id. at 499 (“[T]he central flaw in the system: 99.9 percent of bankrupt 
student loan debtors do not even try to discharge their student loans.”). Iuliano 
argues that “bleak reports have produced a chilling effect that deters debtors from 
pursuing student loan discharges.” Id. at 507. In fact, the bulk of discharges may 
be the product of settlement between debtors and creditors that do not depend on 
judicial determinations of undue hardship. See Aaron Taylor & Daniel Sheffner, 
Oh, What a Relief It (Sometimes) Is: An Analysis of Chapter 7 Bankruptcy 
Petitions to Discharge Student Loans, 27 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 295, 297 (2016). 
 217. Iuliano, supra note 22, at 507 (“[P]eople whose debt is primarily 
comprised of student loans [are deterred] from filing for bankruptcy in the first 
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that there are substantial similarities in the financial charac-
teristics of debtors in bankruptcy who successfully discharge 
their debt in a section 523(a)(8) adversary proceeding and 
debtors in bankruptcy who do not initiate a section 523(a)(8) 
adversary proceeding to discharge their student loan debt.218 
This suggests to Iuliano that many more debtors could obtain 
relief if they sought a discharge.219 Although provocative, 
Iuliano’s results have been subject to significant criticism and 
skepticism.220 
Our proposal encourages more people to seek to discharge 
their student loan debt, but it does so by decreasing the adver-
sarial nature of the process. While Iuliano may be correct that 
it would be useful to encourage more student loan debtors “to 
 
place. After all, why would a person who has a lot of student loan debt file if he 
believes that none of it will be discharged in bankruptcy.”). 
 218. Iuliano, supra note 22, at 502; see also id. at 524 (contending that 
approximately 69,000 debtors in 2007 “would have had a good chance to discharge 
their student loans,” but failed to seek discharge). But see NATL. CONSUMER L. 
CTR., THE TRUTH ABOUT STUDENT LOANS AND THE UNDUE HARDSHIP DISCHARGE 
(2013) (highlighting perceived “shortcomings” in Iuliano’s study and claiming to 
“set[] the record straight on undue hardship in bankruptcy”) 
 219. Iuliano, supra note 22, at 500 (“[T]ens of thousands of non-discharge 
seekers are as bad off financially as the typical discharge seeker.”). 
 220. Various methodological critiques have been lodged against this particular 
work, including by the National Consumer Law Center and Professor Rafael 
Pardo. See NATL. CONSUMER L. CTR., supra note 218, at 4–5; Pardo, Undue 
Hardship, supra note 10, at 2138, 2124–42. Pardo directly disputes Iuliano’s 
apparent assertion that the main problem is “bankruptcy filers’ lack of accurate 
knowledge of the system” as opposed to fundamental access-to-justice barriers. 
Pardo, Undue Hardship, supra note 10, at 2125. Pardo points out that self-
represented debtors, who make up a significant minority of borrowers attempting 
to discharge student loans in bankruptcy, were significantly less likely to 
experience success, holding all other factors constant. See Pardo, Taking 
Bankruptcy, supra note 22, at 1150 (reporting that according to the model 
established by the data, the typical represented debtor may obtain litigation 
success 56.2 percent of the time, but a self-represented debtor’s predicted success 
drops to 28.5 percent). These findings directly conflicted with Iuliano’s prior work. 
Cf. Iuliano, supra note 22, at 507 (finding that 43 percent of pro se debtors 
received a discharge, but only 38 percent of debtors with attorneys received a 
discharge). Moreover, Pardo and Lacey’s research demonstrates that even debtors 
with legal representation faced procedural hurdles apparently unrelated to the 
merits of their cases. See Pardo & Lacey, Real Student Loan Scandal, supra note 
18, at 229 (reporting that three of the five determinants of debtor outcome in their 
study sample are nondoctrinal case characteristics such as the experience level of 
the attorney or the identity of the judge). For a response to some of Pardo’s 
criticisms, see Iuliano, Student Loans and Surmountable Access-to-Justice 
Barriers, supra note 212, at 391 (2016) (suggesting that the two scholars likely 
view the undue hardship similarly but that Pardo is more doubtful and Iuliano 
more optimistic). 
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file adversary proceedings to discharge their student loans,”221 
that approach—standing alone—is not the optimal one. As the 
National Consumer Law Center has pointed out, many student 
loan servicers, such as the ECMC, aggressively defend against 
claims of undue hardship.222 Empirical studies demonstrate 
that the ECMC is particularly effective in discouraging relief 
through “procedural noncompliance” and “pollutive litiga-
tion.”223 As a result, the trial rate for student loan discharge 
actions remains unusually high compared to other types of 
state and federal cases.224 Pardo and Lacey argue that a high 
trial rate in adversary proceedings suggests a low degree of 
certainty in decisional standards, which prevents parties from 
agreeing on expected outcomes and thus prevents more fre-
quent settlement.225 In other words, without a shared under-
standing of the rules that will be applied to an undue hardship 
adversary proceeding, neither party is willing to settle their 
dispute. Thus, Pardo and Lacey argue (and we agree) that it is 
“imperative that the standard be clarified.”226 
In addition, the lack of objective standards encourages liti-
 
 221. Iuliano, supra note 22, at 500. 
 222. See NATL. CONSUMER L. CTR., supra note 218, at 2. ECMC has been 
empirically documented to be effective in its defense efforts. See Pardo, Taking 
Bankruptcy, supra note 22, at 1152–54, 1156–57. 
 223. See Pardo, Undue Hardship, supra note 10, at 2173–78 (observing the 
harm caused to debtors by this behavior and calling for judges to exercise greater 
oversight). See also Pardo, Taking Bankruptcy, supra note 22, at 1152–54, 1156–
57 (explaining model results that indicate odds of litigation success decrease by 70 
percent if ECMC appears as a litigant in the adversary proceeding). 
 224. See NATL. CONSUMER L. CTR., supra note 218, at 2 (finding only 36 
percent of undue hardship proceedings are settled compared to 97 percent of other 
cases); see also Pardo & Lacey, Real Student Loan Scandal, supra note 18, at 211 
(pointing to an unexpectedly high “trial rate in undue hardship discharge 
adversary proceedings” as evidence that the undue hardship standard is too 
vague); Pardo, Undue Hardship, supra note 10, 2108–09 (indicating that the 
“anomalously high trial rate for undue hardship adversary proceedings . . . 
suggests that student-loan creditors may be waging attrition litigation on their 
debtor adversaries”). Although there is some agreement that the trial rate is 
elevated for student loan dischargeability proceedings, there is disagreement 
about the rate itself. See also Pardo, Taking Bankruptcy, supra note 22, at 1146 
(study demonstrates that approximately 6.8 percent of adversary proceedings 
resulted in a trial). 
 225. Pardo & Lacey, Real Student Loan Scandal, supra note 18, at 210 (“It has 
been suggested that the diminishing trial rate in bankruptcy adversary 
proceedings can be attributed to the evolving certainty in decisional standards, 
which has better enabled parties to agree on expected outcomes and thus reach 
settlement with greater frequency.”). 
 226. Id. at 210–11. 
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gation, driving up the cost of pursuing an undue hardship de-
termination and forcing debtors to consider acting pro se in-
stead of obtaining representation.227 Even without hiring coun-
sel, the cost of litigation can be prohibitively expensive, partic-
ularly for individuals currently seeking bankruptcy relief.228 
Instead of encouraging people to file pro se, we advocate the 
more sensible approach of reducing barriers to discharge.229 
B. Statutory Reform Proposals 
Most people who have studied the issue conclude that sec-
tion 523(a)(8) needs to be reformed, if not repealed outright.230 
 
 227. Supra Section II.C. See also Pardo, Taking Bankruptcy, supra note 22, at 
1160–1161 (noting the disproportionately high rate of self-representation for 
debtors in student loan dischargeability proceedings). Pardo’s work also indicates 
that self-represented debtors have significantly lower rates of success. Id. at 
1148–50. 
 228. Pardo conservatively estimates that it would cost between “$4,000 and 
$10,000 to properly litigate a student-loan adversary proceeding, if not more.” 
Pardo, Undue Hardship, supra note 10, at 2138; see also NATL. CONSUMER L. 
CTR., supra note 218, at 3 (noting that “fees can easily mount in the thousands 
and tens of thousands of dollars” and that most debtors cannot pay such high 
fees). In addition, section 523(a)(8) adversary proceedings are complex 
undertakings, with multi-factor tests nested within multi-factor tests. Pardo, 
Undue Hardship, supra note 10, at 2117 (calling the Brunner test “complex” 
because “multifactor considerations [have] proliferat[ed] within a multifactor 
test”). Somewhat curiously, Iuliano argues that “the cost of pursuing a student 
loan discharge is relatively low compared to the cost of filing bankruptcy.” Iuliano, 
supra note 22, at 501. Thus, even when debtors cannot afford an attorney, he 
argues that debtors should file a § 523(a)(8) adversary proceeding pro se. But see 
Taylor & Sheffner, supra note 216, at 315 (2016) (finding a positive correlation 
between attorney representation and student loan relief); id. at 333 (“[D]ebtors 
unable (or unwilling) to retain legal representation were less likely to obtain 
student loan discharge or settlement relief.”). It seems that Iuliano may be 
referring to the financial cost of filing an adversary proceeding, but even so, that 
does not appear to be correct. “[T]he average cost to file for Chapter 7 bankruptcy 
is $1,450.” Survey Results: How Much Does it Cost to File Chapter 7 Bankruptcy?, 
LAWYERS.COM, https://www.lawyers.com/legal-info/bankruptcy/cost-duration/ 
chapter-7-bankruptcy-how-much-does-it-cost.html [https://perma.cc/HNL5-LBY5]. 
Even if Iuliano were referring to the non-financial costs of pursuing an adversary 
proceeding, he would be incorrect. Litigating a § 523(a)(8) adversary proceeding is 
likely to consume a substantial amount of time, particularly for a pro se litigant. 
See, e.g., Pardo, Undue Hardship, supra note 10, at 2140, 2141 n.259. 
 229. Pardo, Undue Hardship, supra note 10, at 2142 (calling for readers to 
reject the assertions made by Iuliano “that access-to-justice barriers are not a 
concern in undue hardship litigation”). 
 230. See, e.g., Note, Ending Student Loan Exceptionalism: The Case for Risk-
Based Pricing and Dischargeability, 126 HARV. L. REV. 587, 589 (2012) 
(advocating “a two-part overhaul of the student loan system, urging the federal 
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One statutory reform proposal, suggested by Abbye Atkinson 
and others,231 is to return the statute to its pre-1990 iteration, 
where student loans older than five years were fully discharge-
able, and debtors were only required to show undue hardship if 
they wished to discharge more recently acquired student 
loans.232 As noted below, an even more dramatic revision of the 
statute—which would allow the discharge of all student loans 
without limitation—has recently been proposed by members of 
Congress.233 
Others have suggested that Congress should change or 
clarify the undue hardship standard, even if that means main-
taining the nondischargeability of student loans generally. For 
example, Kevin J. Smith proposed tying eligibility for a dis-
charge of student loans to the means test.234 G. Michael 
Bedinger VI advocated for a congressional solution to issues 
with the undue hardship standard, including codifying the 
Long test, focusing on totality of the circumstances, and mak-
ing available partial discharges.235 Finally, Rebekah Keller 
called on Congress to “provide a more transparent and objec-
tive standard by which debtors entering into the twists and 
turns of bankruptcy filings can expect some form of consistency 
in terms of discharge and treatment [of their student loans].”236 
Another statutory reform proposal would replace the un-
due hardship standard with an alternative approach. In his ar-
 
government both to begin risk-rating its student loans and to repeal § 523(a)(8) in 
its entirety.” The author argues that this is necessary because “hundreds of 
thousands of debtors per year obtain no relief from billions of dollars of 
educational debt.”); see also Abbye Atkinson, Race, Educational Loans & 
Bankruptcy, 16 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 33 (2010) (arguing that Congress’s “most 
obvious course of action would be to make educational loans fully dischargeable in 
bankruptcy”). 
 231. See Atkinson, supra note 230, at 33 (suggesting that “Congress might 
return to the concept of a mandatory, post-graduate waiting period during which 
the loans would not be dischargeable absent a finding of undue hardship”); 
 232.  11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2018), amended by Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 362(1)–(2) 
(1990). 
 233. See infra note 255. 
 234. See Smith, supra note 18, at 260 (arguing for an objective policy that 
removes judicial discretion by allowing a debtor who “makes less than the limit 
allowed under the ‘means test’ to file bankruptcy” to satisfy Brunner’s first two 
prongs and to satisfy the third prong (good faith) by waiting ten years after 
borrowing the loan to seek discharge). 
 235. See Bedinger VI, supra note 48, at 1836–37. 
 236. Rebekah Keller, The “Undue Hardship” Test: The Dangers of a Subjective 
Test in Determining the Dischargeability of Student Loan Debt in Bankruptcy, 82 
MO. L. REV. 211, 239 (2017). 
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ticle, Undo Undue Hardship: An Objective Approach to Dis-
charging Federal Student Loans in Bankruptcy, Aaron Taylor 
called on Congress to replace the undue hardship standard 
with an alternative statutory framework.237 He argued Pardo 
and Lacey’s empirical work provides “compelling support for a 
new framework for determining the propriety of student loan 
bankruptcy discharges.”238 Taylor argued in favor of a three-
part test for dischargeability. First, the loans must have been 
in repayment for at least five years.239 Second, the borrower 
must have participated in an income-based repayment plan for 
at least three years.240 Third, “[t]he debtor’s Standard monthly 
payment amount (aggregated over the year) must have been 
above applicable maximum debt service thresholds for five con-
secutive years leading up to discharge.”241 
Similarly, Kurt Wiese reviewed the tests bankruptcy 
courts use to determine whether an undue hardship discharge 
is appropriate and concluded that the “results of the tests are 
often unfair and contribute to the waste of societal re-
sources.”242 In their place, Wiese offered two alternative tests 
that might be “a more just and efficient alternative.”243 Nota-
bly, his proposal centered on determining the economic benefit 
to the debtor from their loans.244 For Wiese’s proposition, he 
focused on the decision in In re Yarber, which “held that mak-
ing the debtor pay for an unmarketable education would be an 
undue hardship.”245 His proposal appears to depend on 
creating incentives for institutions of higher education “to 
 
 237. Aaron N. Taylor, Undo Undue Hardship: An Objective Approach to 
Discharging Federal Student Loans in Bankruptcy, 38 J. LEGIS. 185 (2012). 
 238. Id. at 228. 
 239. Id. at 229. In the case of a graduate or professional school program, Taylor 
argues that debtors should be ineligible for discharge of their loans unless the 
debtor has been “in repayment for at least ten years.” Id. 
 240. Id. at 229–30. 
 241. Id. at 231. Taylor used maximum debt service thresholds for his proposal 
based on “a model developed by researchers at the College Board.” Id. 
 242. Kurt Wiese, Discharging Student Loans in Bankruptcy: The Bankruptcy 
Court Tests of “Undue Hardship,” 26 ARIZ. L. REV. 445, 447 (1984). 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. at 457. This is similar to an argument advanced by Daniel A. Austin in 
The Indentured Generation: Bankruptcy and Student Loan Debt, SANTA CLARA L. 
REV. 329, 333 (2013) (advocating for amendments to the Bankruptcy Code that 
would allow student loans to be written down to their actual value, which would 
remain nondischargeable: “the remaining balance of the loan would be 
dischargeable as general unsecured debt”). 
 245. Wiese, supra note 242, at 447. 
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ensure that loan recipients graduate with marketable 
degrees.”246 He argued that his proposal did so because 
institutions of higher education could lose their eligibility to 
participate in Title IV programs if the institution’s students 
discharge too many of their loans in bankruptcy.247 
Still another approach might be reform through rule-
making procedures, targeting procedural hurdles that limit ac-
cess to relief. Pardo has suggested reforms to the Federal Rules 
of Bankruptcy Procedure as a method of improving access to 
justice for debtors seeking discharge of their student loans.248 
In particular, he has argued that student loan dischargeability 
determinations should be treated as contested matters rather 
than adversary proceedings, which would reduce procedural 
complexity and expense for debtors.249 
Although statutory reform is an admirable goal and we 
support the move toward more objective and less ambiguous 
standards, it may not be realistic to expect a revision to the 
statute itself. As others have noted, in the past “Congress has 
not demonstrated any inclination to take serious action in re-
forming student-loan relief through the bankruptcy system.”250 
Proposals to address student loans have recently been pro-
moted by Democratic Party candidates for the 2020 presiden-
tial race, particularly Senator Elizabeth Warren.251 On May 9, 
2019, Senator Dick Durbin, along with Senator Warren and 
other legislators, proposed the Student Borrower Bankruptcy 
Relief Act, which would eliminate section 523(a)(8), making all 
student loans fully dischargeable in bankruptcy.252 However, 
history suggests that this bill will not pass due to the influence 
of political factors unrelated to the merits of the proposal.253 
 
 246. Id. 
 247. See id. at 456–57. This does not appear to be an accurate summation of 
the regulations in existence at the time, which focused not on whether the 
students discharged their loans in bankruptcy but whether too many student 
loans were discharged at all. See 34 C.F.R. § 674.6a (2019); 34 C.F.R. § 682.611 
(2019). 
 248. Pardo, Taking Bankruptcy, supra note 22, at 1175–79. 
 249. Id. at 1176. 
 250. Pardo, Undue Hardship, supra note 10, at 2174–78. 
 251. See Helaine Olen, One Way to Tackle the Student Loan Crisis: Bankruptcy 
Court, WASH. POST (May 15, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ 
2019/05/15/one-way-tackle-student-loan-crisis-bankruptcy-court/ [https://perma.cc/ 
2SWN-HWKR]. 
 252. See S. 1414, 116th Cong. (2019); H.R. 2648, 116th Cong. (2019). 
 253. See Sunlight Foundation, Only Four Percent of Bills Become Law, 
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Accordingly, while we would celebrate more broad-reaching 
legislative reforms, it is advisable to seek other avenues of 
change simultaneously. 
C. Judicial Reforms 
Some scholars have focused on judicially reforming the un-
due hardship standard, either by encouraging substantive 
changes to judicial standards or procedural alterations that 
would facilitate predictability.254 As discussed above, some 
individual judges have taken a more flexible approach to stu-
dent loan discharge litigation than others.255 As Pardo and 
Lacey point out, the current undue hardship case law offers 
courts “free rein to infuse subjectivity into what should be a 
straightforward financial calculation,” leading to inconsistent 
application.256 For example, as discussed in Part I, some judges 
require that the debtor establish only that it is “unlikely” that 
the debtor’s prospects for increasing repayment will improve in 
the future (rather than requiring proof that the debtor’s finan-
cial situation will not materially improve for twenty years or 
more), while others require a “certainty of hopelessness.”257 
Pardo has called on bankruptcy judges to be more aggressive in 
striking procedurally improper pleadings and granting default 
judgments to debtors, which would enable more debtors to ob-
tain discharge absent creditor objection.258 However, although 
 
HUFFPOST (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/the-vast-majority-of-
bill_n_268630 [https://perma.cc/B9LA-EAVF] (“The vast majority of bills are 
essentially dead upon arrival. In any given two-year session of Congress, ten-
thousand or more bills are introduced. But only about 4 percent of them become 
law.”). 
 254. Pardo, Taking Bankruptcy, supra note 22, at 1176. 
 255. See generally Ferek, supra note 41. 
 256. Pardo & Lacey, Real Student Loan Scandal, supra note 18, at 197; see also 
Taylor & Sheffner, supra note 216, at 332 (noting that the undue hardship tests 
“allow for judicial subjectivities to influence outcomes”). 
 257. Compare In re Fern, 553 B.R. 362, 368 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2016) with 
supra Section II.B.2. 
 258. Pardo, Undue Hardship, supra note 10, at 2174–78; see also Pardo & 
Lacey, Undue Hardship in Bankruptcy Courts, supra note 29, at 509 (explaining 
that they “seek to provide a correct interpretation of the meaning of undue 
hardship that will enable courts to apply the standard in a way that comports 
with the command and structure of the Bankruptcy Code, as well as with the 
fresh start principle[s], and that will be more conducive to producing uniform 
results”). Many other authors are also concerned about the lack of uniformity, and 
Pardo himself has recognized these potential problems. See, e.g., Somers & Hollis, 
supra note 211; Pardo, Taking Bankruptcy, supra note 22, at 1165–75. 
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scholars have advocated for judicial uniformity for over a dec-
ade, no such uniformity has emerged.259 
D. Other Administrative Reform Proposals 
In addition to our proposal,260 more than four hundred 
other individuals, organizations, and groups submitted re-
sponses to the ED’s Request for Information (RFI).261 This sec-
tion highlights some of the key takeaways from our survey of 
these responses. The surveyed responses generally agreed on 
three points: (1) ED agents are too aggressive, (2) a set of 
bright line rules for when an undue hardship exists would be 
helpful, and (3) the ED should be disincentivized from engaging 
in pretrial discovery in certain circumstances. Broadly speak-
ing, we agree with all three points. 
1. ED Agents Are Too Aggressive 
A substantial percentage of the surveyed responses agreed 
that the ED should take affirmative steps to “to direct borrow-
ers and student loan holders towards settlement and . . . to ad-
dress pervasive aggressive litigation tactics that raise costs to 
tax payers and prevent eligible borrowers from obtaining stu-
dent loan discharges.”262 The responses expressed a variety of 
 
 259. See supra Part II. 
 260. Dalié Jiménez, et al., Comments of Academics to Department of 
Education’s RFI Regarding Evaluating Undue Hardship Claims in Adversary 
Actions Seeking Student Loan Discharge in Bankruptcy Proceedings (Docket No. 
Ed-2017-Ope-0085) (May 22, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=3183893 [https://perma.cc/3M53-7D25], reprinted in 21 J. OF 
CONSUMER AND COMMERCIAL L. 114 (2018). 
 261. Request for Information on Evaluating Undue Hardship Claims in 
Adversary Actions Seeking Student Loan Discharge Bankruptcy Proceedings, 83 
Fed. Reg. 35 (Feb. 21, 2018). 
 262. See The Higher Education, Not Debt Campaign, Comment Letter on 
Evaluating Undue Hardship Claims (May 22, 2018) [hereinafter HEND 
Response], https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=ED-2017-OPE-0085-0391 
[https://perma.cc/R3GY-YZD3]; see also Jason Iuliano, Comment Letter on 
Evaluating Undue Hardship Claims (May 22, 2018) [hereinafter Iuliano’s 
Response], https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=ED-2017-OPE-0085-0402 
[https://perma.cc/G7ZW-VHTC] (“To help alleviate this problem, the Department 
of Education should ensure that it and its guaranty agencies decline to litigate 
adversary proceedings in which the debtors meet the spirit of the undue hardship 
test.”); The Office of the New York Attorney General and the Office of the 
Massachusetts Attorney General, Together with Eleven Other Attorneys General 
Offices, Comment Letter on Evaluating Undue Hardship Claims (May 23, 2018) 
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concerns related to “overly aggressive litigation tactics.”263 Spe-
cifically, responses complained of the waste of government re-
sources caused by efforts to keep student loan borrowers on the 
hook even when there is no realistic chance that they will ever 
repay a substantial percentage of their loans.264 Responses also 
complained of ED agents creating unnecessary barriers to just 
outcomes for student loan borrowers.265 Finally, responses ex-
pressed concern that overly aggressive litigation discourages 
student loan borrowers from pursuing an undue hardship dis-
charge in the first instance.266 
The responses suggested two primary mechanisms to di-
minish overly aggressive litigation tactics. First, the ED should 
require its agents to stipulate that an undue hardship exists 
once student loan borrowers have made a prima facie showing 
of certain, objectively verifiable facts.267 Second, the ED should 
be required to stipulate to the existence of certain facts without 
engaging in pretrial discovery. As demonstrated above, our 
proposal incorporates both mechanisms. 
 
[hereinafter AG Response], https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=ED-2017-
OPE-0085-0399 [https://perma.cc/Z88Q-TNGP] (“[L]oan holders sometimes 
aggressively contest the claims, even in circumstances where the borrower has a 
legitimate undue hardship claim.”); Twenty-two United States Senators and Fifty-
one Members of Congress, Comment Letter on Evaluating Undue Hardship 
Claims (May 22, 2018) [hereinafter Congressional Response], https://www 
.regulations.gov/document?D=ED-2017-OPE-0085-0400 [https://perma.cc/R37D-
5A6S] (“Aggressive litigation in bankruptcy court against student borrowers who 
are unlikely to make a reasonable repayment to the federal government is a waste 
of taxpayer resources and a short-sighted policy that keeps millions of Americans 
from contributing to economic growth.”); NACBA Response, supra note 125 
(“Instead, as a matter of course—in virtually all cases—any attempt to obtain 
such a discharge is met with harsh opposition, including motions for 
reconsideration and appeals.”); National Consumer Law Center, Comment Letter 
on Evaluating Undue Hardship Claims (May 18, 2018) [hereinafter NCLC 
Response], https://www.regulations.gov/ document?D=ED-2017-OPE-0085-0369 
[https://perma.cc/9WS3-K3DX] (describing “overly aggressive litigation tactics 
that have been used in undue hardship cases, which have imposed far greater 
barriers to justice on debtors than those facing litigants in other civil litigation”). 
 263. NCLC Response, supra note 262, at 2. 
 264. See Congressional Response, supra note 262. 
 265. See generally NCLC Response, supra note 262. 
 266. AG Response, supra note 262, at 2 (“Such tactics unfairly deprive 
borrowers of their right to relief from their debt, and further, discourage other 
eligible borrowers from seeking to discharge their loans.”). 
 267. This presumption would be rebuttable. 
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2. Bright Line Rules Would Be Helpful 
There was substantial agreement among many of the sur-
veyed responses that the ED ought to delineate a set of objec-
tive criteria that, if established, would create a rebuttable pre-
sumption that an undue hardship exists.268 The responses 
diverged somewhat as to the specific criteria that should create 
a presumption of undue hardship, but there was a significant 
degree of overlap with our own proposal. For example, many 
responses called on the ED to direct its agents to stipulate that 
an undue hardship exists when a borrower’s income falls below 
a certain threshold combined with some other factor, such as 
disability or that the borrower is a family caregiver of a 
veteran.269 
Although many responses were similar,270 our proposal is 
more expansive. For example, our proposal is the only one that 
calls for a rebuttable presumption of undue hardship when a 
borrower’s household income is less than 150 percent of the 
federal poverty guidelines and the borrower ceased attending 
an institution of higher education without receiving a de-
gree.271 This and other unique criteria reflect additional situa-
tions in which borrowers face an undue hardship in repaying 
their student loans—situations in which the borrower is un-
likely to be able to repay their student loans because of their 
employment prospects and potential career growth.272 
 
 268. See AG Response, supra note 262; Congressional Response, supra note 
262; Comments Submitted by the American Banking Institute’s Commission on 
Consumer Bankruptcy, Comment Letter on Evaluating Undue Hardship Claims 
(May 21, 2018) [hereinafter ABI Response], https://www.regulations.gov/document 
?D=ED-2017-OPE-0085-0378 [https://perma.cc/D5GA-4VMV]; NACBA Response, 
supra note 125; NCLC Response, supra note 262; Mark Kantrowitz, Comment 
Letter on Evaluating Undue Hardship Claims (Mar. 5, 2018) [hereinafter 
Kantrowitz Response], https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=ED-2017-OPE-
0085-0014 [https://perma.cc/4BL2-RNTU]. 
 269. AG Response, supra note 262, at 3–4; Congressional Response, supra note 
262, at 3 (citing Cohen Letter, supra note 31); Kantrowitz Response, supra note 
268; ABI Response, supra note 268, at 4–5. 
 270. See, e.g., Congressional Response, supra note 262, at 3. 
 271. Some of the individual responses did focus on the fraud perpetrated on 
students by some institutions, but, of the surveyed responses, only the AG 
Response explicitly calls upon the ED to do more to protect students victimized by 
their institutions. 
 272. INVESTING IN HIGHER EDUCATION: BENEFITS, CHALLENGES, AND THE 
STATE OF STUDENT DEBT 41 (2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/ 
default/files/page/files/20160718_cea_student_debt.pdf (last visited July 9, 2019) 
[https://perma.cc/V2KW-CJM4] (stating “non-completers had default rates of 25 
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Our proposal is also more restrictive in some ways. For ex-
ample, several other responses that call on the ED to establish 
similar presumptions use an income threshold of 175–200 per-
cent of the federal poverty line, whereas we use 150 percent.273 
We set our income-level thresholds slightly lower than those in 
many other responses because borrowers with income at or be-
low these levels—given necessary expenses to pay for housing, 
transportation, and other essentials—are more likely to be in 
severe financial distress, enduring undue hardship by paying 
their student loans.274 
Some responses use a comparison to the median family in-
come instead of the federal poverty guidelines. As discussed 
above, we prefer to use the federal poverty guidelines, although 
we acknowledge the strengths and weaknesses of both meas-
urements.275 Median family income takes into account differ-
ences in cost of living between states and is already used ex-
tensively in bankruptcy cases. However, because of large 
differences in median incomes across states, using median in-
come as the standard would create a presumption of undue 
hardship to individuals who are not necessarily considered 
“poor” under other federal programs.276 In some states, a be-
 
percent after three years, compared with just 9 percent among completers”). 
 273. See, e.g., Congressional Response, supra note 262, at 3; ABI Response, 
supra note 268, at 1, 4–5. 
 274. By contrast, the Kantrowitz Response ties his proposal to the federal 
poverty level, rather than 150 percent of the federal poverty level, as our proposal 
does. Kantrowitz suggests that using the federal poverty level may be more 
appropriate because it is “defined as an income level below which the family has 
no discretion in how it spends its income to pay for necessary living expenses.” 
Kantrowitz Response, supra note 268, at 2. Additionally, he states: “One might 
argue that the difference between 100% of the poverty line and 150% of the 
poverty line is the difference between undue hardship and a partial financial 
hardship.” Id. at 1. We agree in substance but believe that the federal poverty 
level no longer accurately captures the line where families lack discretionary 
income. As such, we’ve chosen a slightly higher threshold. Kantrowitz’s proposal 
also appears slightly more subjective than ours and forces debtors to establish 
that their net income is below the federal poverty level, whereas we believe that 
our proposal creates easier-to-establish categories. See id. at 1–2. 
 275. See discussion supra Section III.B.1. 
 276. Unfortunately, this also means that some people not covered by our 
proposal are likely to be quite deserving of relief from their student loans. For 
instance, one advantage of using median income, which is state-based, instead of 
the federal poverty guidelines, which does not vary by locality, is that it accounts 
for differences between high-cost and low-cost states. Thus, our proposal will be 
less generous to individuals in high-cost states than a median income proposal 
would be. We emphasize that our proposal is meant to serve as a floor on relief 
that ought to be granted and not as a ceiling. 
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low-median-income debtor might still have a substantial in-
come. For example, in 2017 the median household income in 
New Jersey was more than $76,000.277 
We recognize the objections to the federal poverty guide-
lines. In contrast to median family income, the poverty guide-
lines are consistent across states, failing to account for differ-
ences in incomes and cost of living across state lines. 
Furthermore, although ubiquitous within federal programs, 
they do not serve as the basis for most bankruptcy calculations. 
Nevertheless, we prefer the consistency of the federal poverty 
guidelines, and a number of courts do use them as a reference 
point for determining whether an undue hardship exists.278 
What is more, there is little dispute that individuals at 150 
percent of the poverty line are, in fact, poor, whatever their 
state of residence. Accordingly, we think the federal poverty 
guidelines are preferable. 
Some other proposals agree that more should be done for 
student loan borrowers but do not provide concrete suggestions. 
By contrast, our proposal is more refined. For example, the Na-
tional Student Legal Defense Network Response (NSLDN Re-
sponse) argues—and we agree—that “[t]he Department should 
guide holders not to contest an undue hardship claim on the 
basis of whether a borrower has met the ‘certainty of hopeless’ 
standard where a realistic look at the borrower’s circumstances 
indicates the borrower’s inability to repay is likely to persist 
into the future.”279 However, the NSLDN Response does not op-
erationalize this advice, writing instead that the ED “should 
give guidance to loan holders to consent to undue hardship 
claims where the testimony of the borrower (and, if available, 
friends, family, or a treating physician) is sufficient to satisfy 
Brunner.”280 Our proposal contains the concrete guidance the 
NSLDN Response calls for. 
Finally, another major difference between our proposal 
and the other surveyed responses is support for partial dis-
 
 277. By contrast, for a one-person household, the 2019 poverty guideline is 
$12,490 in annual income; a two-person household is $16,910; three people are 
allowed $21,330, etc. Poverty Guidelines, supra note 114. 
 278. See supra text accompanying notes 73–77. 
 279. National Student Legal Defense Network, Comment Letter on Evaluating 
Undue Hardship claims 3 (May 22, 2018) [hereinafter NSLDN Response], 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=ED-2017-OPE-0085-0397 [https://perma 
.cc/URX4-EN6C]. 
 280. Id. at 1. 
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charges. Our proposal does not propose a structure for partial 
discharges. However, others proposed that if a household files 
chapter 13, a certain percentage of loans should be payable 
through the repayment plan.281 Although allowing for partial 
discharge may seem an attractive compromise, it merely cre-
ates additional layers of unnecessary complication without 
substantially altering likely outcomes. Our proposal’s simplic-
ity will encourage more borrowers to seek a student loan dis-
charge, which nearly all responders agree is appropriate. 
3. The ED Should Engage in Less Pretrial Discovery 
Respondents also generally identified concerns regarding 
aggressive litigation tactics by ED agents that impose unfair 
and onerous burdens on individuals seeking a discharge of 
their loans. As the American Bankruptcy Institute Response 
argues, “[i]f the borrower submits satisfactory evidence of un-
due hardship outside the litigation process, the student loan 
creditor should agree that the debtor is entitled to discharge of 
the student loan debt.”282 Too often, agents representing the 
ED in litigation make duplicative and expensive discovery re-
quests when the requested information is already available 
from documents previously filed under penalty of perjury by 
the borrower in the underlying bankruptcy case. For example, 
debtors in chapter 13 cases are required to file their previous 
four years of tax returns, which could establish a debtor’s long-
term poverty without requiring further information from the 
debtor.283 As observed by Pardo, updated information may be 
warranted where there has been a significant delay between 
the filing of the case and the filing of the adversary proceeding 
to discharge the debt.284 The particulars of when such updates 
will be required should be established by rule and clearly com-
municated to debtors upon their filing. 
On a related note, several responses called on the ED to 
force its agents “to cease engaging in unnecessary and expen-
 
 281. NACBA Response, supra note 125, at 6. 
 282. ABI Response, supra note 268, at 5. 
 283. See 11 U.S.C. § 1308(a) (2018). 
 284. See Pardo, Taking Bankruptcy, supra note 22, at 1146 (finding the mean 
delay in his sample between the commencement of the bankruptcy case and the 
adversary proceeding was 257 days); FED. R. BANKR. P. 4007(b) (permitting a 
debt-dischargeability action to be filed at any time). 
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sive pre-trial discovery,” such as by requesting information 
about “inappropriate and unnecessary factors” that are unre-
lated to “the borrower’s ability to pay the amount of” student 
loan debt owed.285 Far too often ED agents engage in extensive 
discovery to argue that certain expenses, such as restaurant 
meals, were unnecessary and that these funds should have 
been used to repay student loan debt instead.286 But, as the 
NCLC Response argues, too often “individual expenses are 
highlighted without consideration of the debtor’s overall budget 
or attempts to reduce expenses, in order to portray the debtor 
as irresponsible. This is done even in cases in which the 
debtor’s income may be below the poverty level.”287 In other 
words, if a debtor’s income is below the poverty line, whether a 
student loan debtor spent twelve dollars at McDonald’s should 
be irrelevant.288 We agree with those responses that call on the 
ED to limit discovery, and thereby reduce costs, as reflected in 
our proposal. 
As many have noted, ED agents are often very aggressive 
in defending against claims of undue hardship.289 This may 
cause a reduction in willingness to settle cases.290 By refusing 
to settle cases even when the amounts the ED is likely to re-
cover are small and by engaging in “pollutive litigation,” ED 
agents may discourage student loan borrowers from seeking 
discharge in the first instance.291 The ED should treat this pro-
posal as an “opportunity to make it simpler and fairer for bor-
rowers who have demonstrated legitimate hardships to receive 
an ‘undue hardship’ discharge.”292 As recommended herein, the 
ED should create a set of rebuttable presumptions for estab-
lishing undue hardship and thereby discourage unnecessary 
litigation, particularly pretrial discovery. 
CONCLUSION 
Our proposal would go a long way towards resolving many 
 
 285. HEND Response, supra note 262, at 1. 
 286. See NCLC Response, supra note 262, at 3. 
 287. Id. at 3. 
 288. See id. 
 289. See NATL. CONSUMER L. CTR., supra note 218, at 2; see also Pardo, Undue 
Hardship, supra note 10, at 2142–73. 
 290. See discussion supra Section II.C. 
 291. See Pardo, Undue Hardship, supra note 10, at 2108–09. 
 292. Congressional Response, supra note 262, at 3. 
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of the grosser inequities currently associated with restrictions 
on student loan discharge in the Bankruptcy Code. Applying a 
floor under which the ED will stipulate to a discharge, rather 
than engage in costly litigation, will promote greater con-
sistency in outcomes, discourage courts from engaging in inap-
propriate and idiosyncratic moralizing, save time and effort for 
struggling debtors, and reduce costs to American taxpayers. It 
is our hope that the ED will adopt these proposals, which can 
provide targeted relief until Congress sees fit to revise the 
Bankruptcy Code. 
